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THE NEW AND IMPROVED "NEW ECONOMICS" 
by Leslie Darbyshire, Professor 
Dept. of Operations Research and 
Administrative Sciences 
In the midst of the continuing debate between the monetarists and the fiscal 
11engineers11 as to the most appropriate method of controlling the economy, some funda-
mental changes are occurring in American governmental affairs •• Economists now find 
themselves in the role of defrocked witch-doctors as a result of their continuing 
inability to foresee the outcomes of the various poultices applied to the U.S. patient 
during the last five years. The combination of recession and inflation we continue to 
experience is as well described by a Phillips screwdriver as a Phillips curve. 
We were made to realize last fall that there were limits to the willingness of our 
trading partners to continually hoard dollars in financing our overseas excesses. We 
have not yet discovered that there is a domestic equivalent of this balance of payments 
readjustment. Quite apart from whatever benefits accrue .from the spendings of the pur-
posive deficits of our full-employment budget there is a non-trivial problem of placing 
an extra $40 billion of Federal debt in a non~nflationary mode, particularly since it 
has to be superimposed on a mountain of increasingly short-tenn debt already in exist-
ence. Rolling this debt over, as each certificate reaches its maturity date, is already 
causing severe headaches for all major users of American capital markets. 
The other side of the coin poses extraordinary problems in "efficient" spending. 
How does any institution go about deciding to spend an extra $40 billion in aid to 
achieve reasonably ordered objectives? How do you control such incremental spendings, 
through what existing institutions; what additional agencies do you create, how do you 
assemble the necessary talents in such a short period of time? What are the prospects 
of dismantling whatever part of the spending apparatus proves later to be somewhat less 
than useful? Perhaps even more fundamental I what kinds of lasting benefits are supposed 
to accrue? 
The prospects of spending a vastly increased amount of money are almost certainly 
extremely attractive to a decision maker who has the nasty assignment of having to 
choose between alternatives. If the budget restraint is pushed farther and farther out, 
such nasty choices don•t have to be made; everybody can apparently be satisfied. 
Suppose now that the diagnosis of the economy•s malaise is incorrect and that our 
11alledged11 6 per cent unemployment is more structural than a function of inadequate 
aggregate demand? What kinds of spendings will lead to full employment for aerospace 
engineers, unskilled minority groups, elementary schoolteachers, physicists, etc.? 
Why do people continue to save dollars that are plentiful, cheap and losing value each 
day? Where is the model that satisfactorily explains rising wage rates in backward 
industries such as railroads, rising prices in industries saddled with excess outdated 
capacfty such as steel? How can the populace continue to thwart the best efforts of 
our leaders especially when they are the recipients of such magnificent expert advice? 
l 
DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT 
OF THE M-16 RIFLE 
by T. L. Ga:tchel. 
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' 
In order to fully understand the decisions behind the development and procure-
ment of the'M-16rifle, one must look back to WWII. In 1942 the Gennans developed 
a weapon that was to have lasting, long-range effects on the development of military 
small anns. Designated an assault rifle (sturmgewehr), the new weapon was radically 
different from standard military rifles in several ways. First, it fired a new 
intenned1ate cartridge that was shorter and less powerful than a standard rifle 
cartridge. Second, the new rifle was capable of selective fire. In other words. 
it could be fired either semiautomatically like a rifle or fully automatically like 
a submachine gun. Thi-rd it was shorter and more compact than a standard rifle. and, 
0 
finally, its production relied heavily on the use of stampings and non-strategic O 
materials for low cost and ease of manufacture. 
Following WWII, many European governments followed the German lead and developed 
assault rifles and intermediate cartridges. Notable examples were the Soviet AK-47, 
the British EM-2, and the Belgian FAL. /1 The U.S. Army, however, devoted its efforts 
to developing a standard rifle with selective fire capability that would fire a 
shortened, but still full power, cartridge. The latter was made possible by the 
development of more powerful gunpowders. 
/1 In 1951 Britain adopted the EM-2 and a .280 caliber intennediate cartridge. 
Later that year Winston Churchill returned to office as prime minister and personally 






This difference in concept between the Europeans and Americans presented a 
severe problem for NATO, which was attempting to standardize anmunition for all member 
nations. The U.S. strongly desired that the American cartridge be adopted and, after 
applying pressure on its allies, prevailed. In August of 1954 NATO adopted the Ameri-
can cartridge, which was then designated the 7.62 mm NATO. Canada, Great Britain, 
and Belgium all adopted the FAL for use with the new cartridge, but the U.S. did not 
have a rifle to fire its own ammunition. A brief look at how such a rifle was even-
tually developed provides an interesting comparison with the later M-16 program. 
As early as 1952 the Army began testing several rifles including the FAL, the 
EM-2, and what was to become the M-14./2 By 1955 the field had been reduced to the 
M-14 and the FAL, and the Army had gone-so far as to have some of the latter manu-
factured by two American small arms firms to determine the problems of converting the 
metric working drawings into U.S. measurements. Both weapons were considered satis-
factory, and tests continued into late 1956 when another weapon, the AR-10, entered 
the field. Developed by Armalite, Inc., the AR-10 was a relatively advanced assault 
rifle that made considerable use of plastics, metal stampings, and other advanced 
fabrication techniques. In spite of its advantages, the AR-10 entered the testing 
too late to be a serious competitor, and in May of 1957 the U.S. Army adopted the 
M-14. In keeping with the long standing policy of maintaining multiple sources for 
major weapons, the Army awarded M-14 production contracts to three civilian firms in 
addition to producing them at Springfield Armory. 
In addition to standardizing U.S. Almlunition with NATO, the M-14 was supposed 
to have provided another major benefit. It was to have replaced not only the M-1 
rifle, but also the Browning Automatic Rifle, the carbine and the submachine gun. 
This, in turn, would have meant a single cartridge for all infantry type weapons 
except the pistol./3 The M-14 proved to be a good rifle, but was inadequate in 
several other respects. It was too large to be a good replacement for the submachine 
gun and was only marginally conti-ollable when employed as an automatic rifle (fully 
automatic fire). 
As is the case with most weapons systems, the adoption of a new rifle does not 
halt the search for an even newer one. Accordingly, the Arrey became interested in 
developing a new weapon to fire a high velocity, .22 caliber intermediate round. The 
idea of a small caliber, high velocity round was not new, but the state of propellant 
and weapons manufacture had caused earlier attempts to be generally unsatisfactory for 
military purposes. In 1957 the Army announced specifications, and Winchester and 
Armalite both developed rifles and cartridges to meet them. The Armalite rifle was 
essentially a scaled down A R-10 firing a modified version of an existing Remington 
commercial· cartridge. The new rifle was designated the AR-15. The two weapons were 
tested during 1958 and 1959, and in 1959 the Arll\Y placed an order for 1,000 AR-151s. 
Armalite had spent $1,450,000 in developing the AR-15 to this point, and, in spite of 
the potential, felt that it could not continue. Colt's Patent Firearms Manufacturing 
Company of Hartford, Connecticut, stepped in and purchased the design, manufacturing, 
and marketing rights for the new rifle. 
For perspective it should be noticed that the first M-14s were not delivered to 
the Army until October of 1959. In March of the following year General Trudeau testi-
fied before a Congressional hearing that the M-14 would be obsolescent by 1965, and 
that the Arrey was looking for a replacement.Ji At this time the potential replacements 
were not limited to conventional firearms. Possibilities included such concepts as 
/~ Designated the M-14 upon adoption, it was called the T-44 during testing. 
/3 The M-6-rnachinegun, which fires the NATO cartridge, was also adopted at 
this tiiiie. 
/4 John Lachuk, 11The M-14 Rifle •.. Hail and Fairwell. 11 Gun Digest, 1965, 
p. 54. -
3 
small caliber rocket launchers and a Special Purpose Individual Weapon (SPIW) designed 
to fire dart-like fle chet t es at point targets and some type of explosive charge at 
area targets. 
The AR-15 was given a big boost toward becoming that replacement when General 
Curtis Le May became personally interested in it as a possible replacement for the M-1 
carbines used by the Air Force's security troops. A test was conducted at Lackland 
Air Force Base in which the AR-15 was compared with both the M-14 and the Soviet AK-47. 
The AR-15 performed well and was considered to best meet the requirements of the Air 
Force, so in Septerrber of 1962 the Air Force awarded Colt a contract for 8t500 AR-15 
rifles. By this time the AR-15 had been given the military designation M-16. Some 
of these Air Force M-16s were turned over to the Army's Special Forces for cormat 
testing in Vietnam. In retrospect it can be seen that this contract was the first 
step in a major procurement program that seemed to grow without adequate planning. It O 
seems reasonable that decisions should have been made concerning several important 
questions: 
1) Should the Arll\Y have attempted to jump past another conventional rifle to 
develop an unconventional type individual weapon such as the SPIW to re-
place the M-14? 
2) If not should the Army have adopted the M-16 or continued to experiment 
further? 
3) Should the Air Force have been allowed to adopt the M-16 if the AnTlY didn't? 
In discussing the above questions the following fac ts are important: 
1) The Army and Marine Corps were not completely satisfied with the M-14, but 
neither were completely convinced of the effectiveness of the 5.56 nm (.22 
caliber) cartridge./5 
2) The Air Force was not involved with the M-14 and definitely wanted the M-16. 
3) Generally speaking, U.S. small arms have been developed by the Army and 
have then been adopted by all services for reasons of standardization. 
4) Developmental contracts were let to Springfield Armory and 3 civilian firms 
to develop prototype SPIW to be tested in February of 1963. The tests 
showed that the SPIW was a long way from being a practical weapon. 
5) Almost without exception, U.S. standard rifles had been developed and first 
manufactured at Springfield Armory with later production by other U.S. 
arsenals and civilian firms . Other types of small arms, however, have 
generally been developed by civilian manufacturers. 
6} U.S. forces in Vietnam nurrbered approximately 14,000 advisors and special 
forces personnel. Predictions by the Secretary of Defense and chairman of 
the joint chiefs of staff were that all U.S. troops would be out of Vietnam 
by 1965. 







7) Ariey plans for FY 1964 included the purchase of 851000 M-16s to equip 
their airborne divisions and one test air assault division. 
In fact, no definite plans were made, and procurement of the M-16 continued in 
a haphazard manner. Table l shows the chronology of M-16 contracts to date. 
Technical Problems 
A good deal of the controversy surrounding the M-16 was directly related to 
technical problems. Similar problems have occurred in the development of almost all 
military small arms, but in the past the problems have not been so widely publicized. 
The first of these problems involved the rate of twist of the rifling. The 
original M-16s were manufactured and tested with barrels with a rate of twist of one 
turn in 14 inches. Later accuracy tests, however, showed that the standard 55 grain 
bullet became unstable when fired through these barrels during cold weather, and, 
that even at ordinary temperatures, the dispersion was twice that of bullets fired 
under the same conditions from barrels with a rate of twist of one turn in 12 inches. 
If accuracy were the sole criterion, the answer would be obvious. In the case of the 
5.56 mm round, it isn't. The 5.56 mm bullet makes up for its small size partly by 
its extremely high velocity and partly by being only marginally stable in flight. 
When the bullet meets resistance, this balance is upset, and the bullet begins to 
tuni>le. The turmling effect gives the bullet a lethality out of proportion to its 
size. The tradeoffs involved here were sunmed up by Dr. Wilbur B. Payne, Chief of 
Operations Research, Undersecretary of the Arnty, as follows: 
The experiments available would indicate the less stable the bullet, 
the more lethal when it hits the target, correspondingly, the less 
accurate it is, the lower the probability of hitting the target./~ 
The conflict was resolved in favor. of increased accuracy, the 12 inch twist 
barrel was adopted, and earlier rifles were converted. The problem did not end there 
because, even with the new barrels, the 55 grain bullet did not possess the range 
capability required for effective machine gun fire. A heavier, long-range bullet was 
developed but was unsatisfactory since it would have required still another barrel 
change. This, in effect, left two alternatives: continue to attempt to develop a 
satisfactory machine gun for the 5.56 mm round or drop such attempts and continue to 
use the 7.62 mm NATO round for the machine guns. 
One attempt to follow the first course of action resulted in the Stoner 63. De-
signed by the designer of the M-16 and produced by Cadillac Gage Co., the Stoner 63 
was a family of weapons that could be assembled from a series of interchangeable com-
ponents./7 By using different coni>inations of parts, various types of rifles, carbines, 
submachine guns, and machine guns could be assembled, all firing the 5.56 nm round. 
The Marine Corps tested the Stoner system and was favorably impressed, but it was not 
considered feasible for the Marine Corps to adopt a rifle that was not in the Army 
supply system. 
This left alternative two, one round for the rifle and a different one for the 
machine gun. Theoretically this is poor but in practice is not as bad as it seems. 
The M-14 rifle and M-fO machine gun both use the 7.62 mm NATO round, for example. 
/6 E. H. Harrison, "What's Ahead for the M-16? An Expert Takes a Look." 
American Rifleman, January 1968, p. 31. 
/7 Eugene Stoner was chief engineer at Armalite, Inc., where he designed the 
AR-10, AR-15 (M-16) and AR-18, among others, before leaving to work on the Stoner 63. 
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Although the individual rounds are identical, rifle arnnunition is packaged in bandoleers 
containing five round clips while machine gun ammunition comes linked into 250 round 
belts. Since it is not practicable to link rifle ammunition into machine gun belts 
in the field and vice versa, two types of ammunition exist in practice. The real 
problem was that the Aney had stressed the advantages of having a single round for both 
weapons when pressing for the adoption of the 7.62 mm round by NATO. 
The most serious of the technical problems centered around the propellant or 
powder used in the 5.56 nm cartridges. The round had been developed cornnercially by 
Remington Arms Co., and that company produced the initial lots of military ammunition. 
/8 The powder used was Ou Pont IMR 4475, an extruded nitrocellulose poWder originally 
developed for the 7.62 mm NATO round. As long as the production lots remained small, 
everything was fine. In January 1964, however, Ou Pont notified the Aney that IMR 
4475 could not be produced in large lots and still meet the Army's pressure specifica- 0 
tions. The only way of consistently meeting the pressure standards would have been 
to reduce the velocity of the bullet. Since the bullet's lethality had already been 
reduced by changing the twist of the rifling, the Aney felt that;~ could not afford 
to reduce it further by l owerf ng the ve 1 oci ty. · 
Accordingly, the Aney asked Ou Pont, Hercules, Inc., and Olin Mathison Chemical 
Co. to submit Powder samples that could meet the requirements. The Hercules sample was 
unsatisfactory. DuPont's CR 8136, a powder similar to IMR 4475, was accepted and 
adopted by Remington. Olin submitted WC 846, a ball powder, which was accepted and 
chosen by Olin's ammunition division, Winchester-Western and also by the Federal 
Cartridge Co. Named for the shape of the individual grains, ball powder was developed 
after WWI to make use of surplus artillery propellant and has been successfully used 
in all U.S. rifle and machine gun amnunition since that time. It had been used inter-
changeably with IMR type powder in billions of rounds with no hint of the troubles to 
come. 
In March of 1964 it became obvious that when ammunition loaded with the WC 846 
ball powder was fired i n the M-16, an unacceptably high number of malfunctions occurred, 
Colt notified the ArlllY that if ball powder ammunition was used for the acceptance tests, 
more than half the rifles would fail to meet the requirements. In spite of the fact 
that a large portion of service ammunition was of the ball powder type, the AMI\Y 
al l owed Colt to use only IMR type ammunition for the acceptance tests. A special House 
of Representatives investigating committee describing this decision said that ft 
0 borders on criminal negligence. "/9 It would be difficult to disagree . 
In Decemer 1964 the problem-was compounded when Remington notified the AntlY that 
Du Pont CR 8136 was also beginning to show excessive pressure dispersion . As a result, 
Remington switched to Olin's WC 846. This meant that the ArlllY was back to a "sole sup-
plier " situation. and that all producers were using the problem-causing ball powder. 
The Artl\Y again called for new samples, and the only satisfactory one submitted was Du 
Pont's IMR 8208M. All three conmercial suppliers preferred to continue loading the ball Q 
powder, so the Army directed that the new powder be loaded at two of its government-
owned, contractor-operated ammunition plants . This move solved the single source of 
supply problem but not the more serious one of the u~explained malfunctions. 
Looking back several years later, an AntlY spokesman expressed the following 
opinion: 
7! Remington Arms Co. is owned largely by Du Pont. 






Had the Army anticipated these developments, it is most unlikely that 
the course chosen in January 1964 would have been the same. A decision 
to reduce the velocity requirement, and continue loading IMR 4475 pro-
pellant would probably have been made instead, and the development of 
alternate propellants could have been pursued more deliberately./].Q_ 
Combat Problems and Resulting Modification 
After studying the problem thoroughly, Eugene Stoner, Colt's experts, and the 
Ann,y's Small Arms Weapons Study Group all reached, the conclusion that the use of WC 
846 ball powder was causing two bad effects. It significantly increased the rate of 
fire of the M-16, which was known to cause malfunctions, and it produced more fouling 
than IMR type powders, which was thought to cause malfunctions. 
The first of these effects was overcome by redesigning the buffer of the M-16 
to bring the rate of fire back down to the level for which the weapon had been designed. 
Technically this was relatively simple, but a lack of urgency on the part of the Army 
and Colt resulted in a year passing before the new buffers were available in the field. 
The redesigned buffer solved certain problems but not the serious failure to extract a 
fired cartridge, that could leave a soldier in corrbat with a useless weapon until he 
could clear the bore with a cleaning rod. 
In 1966 this problem changed from a more-or-less theoretical one to a practical 
one as an increasing number of incidents of this nature began to occur in Vietnam. 
Colt i1T111ediately sent two four-man troubleshooting teams to Vietnam to investigate the 
problem. Their opinion was that the troubles were caused largely by poor maintenance 
on the part of the individual soldier resulting from a lack of effort, poor training, 
and a lack of cleaning gear. The lack of cleaning gear was an inexcusable logistics 
foul-up, but the other two factors warrant further explanation. Unlike most small 
arms, that have been adopted and "shaken down" during peace-time, the M-16 was, in 
many cases, initially issued to units that were already in combat in Vietnam. The re-
sulting inadequate time for thorough training was compounded by the fact that the M-16 
had been ballyhooed by its supporters as a weapon that required almost no care. Train-
ing manuals, for example, contained such statements as: 
This weapon requires the least maintenance of any type weapon within the 
Ar111Y arsenal today. 
This weapon will fire longer without cleaning or oiling than any other 
known ri fl e . 
An occasional cleaning will keep the weapon functioning indefinitely./}l 
Manuals were changed to reflect the need for careful weapons maintenance, and 
training was increased, so the maintenance situation was much improved when the Colt 
teams returned to Vietnam in early 1967. Unfortunately,the extraction malfunctions had 
not improved. Mr. Stoner and Colt's experts felt certain that problems were being 
caused by the added fouling from the WC 846 powder. The Army Material Conmand isagreed 
stating that an extensive testing program had failed to show any connection between the 
fouling and the malfunctions. In fact, they had been unable to produce a high rate of 
malfunctions during testing in spite of efforts to duplicate every possible condition 
encountered by· the troops in Vietnam 
/lO Ibid. p. 29. 
Ill Ibid. p. 26. 
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In the meantime, several other attempts were made to solve the problem. A 
chrome plated chamber was developed, which seemed to have some effect on reducing the 
failure to extract malfunctions. Poor lubrication was also thought to be a possible 
cause of the problem, so a replacement was sought for the rifle grease that had been 
used with the M-1 and M-14. After trying a number of lubricants, the Ar11ty settled on 
one that had been developed in 1959 for the Air Force's 20 rran "Vulcan" cannon. The 
delay in finding a satisfactory lubricant was another of the many aspects of the M-16 
program that was criticized by the House investigating committee, but there appears to 
have been no reason to have supposed that the lubricant that was finally chosen would 
have worked any better than the ones that had been tried and rejected. It was largely 
a trial and error pr ocedure with a large nurrber of possibilities. 
Along the line there had also been a controversial major modification to the 
M-16. The design of the M-16 is such that the bolt cannot be closed by hand. The bolt 0 
can be opened by hand but is closed by spring pressure. If some obstruction is present 
that cannot be overcome by the spring, the rifle must be disassembled and the obstruc-
tion cleared before the bolt will go home. The Arrey felt that this characteristic was 
unsuitable for a combat weapon and requested a modification that would allow the bolt 
to be closed by hand. The requested change was made, and the resulting rifle was 
designated the M-16Al. /12 The resulting cost increase of $3.50 per rifle was yet another 
target for criticism bythe House investigating committee. The Air Force wanted no 
part of the modification and continued to procure M-16's. The Marine Corps expressed 
fear that, when the bolt would not close by itself, forcing it closed might only aggra-
vate the problem. Nevertheless, the Marines eventually adopted the M-16Al in spite 
of these reservations. In January of 1967, the Marine Corps announced that it would use 
the new rifle to equip Marines in Vietnam, who at that time were using the M-14. The 
major factor behind this decision was standardization with the Arrey. 
No one approach seems to have solved the technical problems that plagued the M-16, 
but the co!l'bination of them apparently did. The malfunctions ceased to be a problem, 
and the M-16 was generally well accepted by the troops. In many respects its light 
weight and selective fire capability made it ideal for the particular needs of combat in 
Vietnam. 
Procurement Problems 
Not all of the Arrey's problems with the M-16 were of a technical nature. A list 
of items criticized by the House investigating conmittee would also contain the manage-
ment of the procurement program. A particularly sore point with the committee was the 
failure of the Army to aggressively negotiate with Colt for the manufacturing rights of 
the M-16. 
Most of the U.S. military small arms have been developed by commercial firms with 
the government later purchasing the manufacturing rights and establishing multiple pro- 0 
duction facilities either at government arsenals or other civilian plants. The purpose 
behind this policy is sound: to ensure uninterrupted production in the event of sabotage 
or labor troubles . In Septerrber 1963, the Arrey accordingly requested from Colt a quota-
tion on the design, manufacturing, and marketing rights for the M-16. Colt refused 
stating that no such request would be considered until requirements for the rifle ex-
ceeded 500,000 units. Since the ArlllY did not anticipate the need for that many weapons, 
no pressure was applied, and the matter was pursued on an informal, oral basis only. 
/12 For simplicity, the term M-16 will be used in this paper for both weapons 




In October 1964, Colt took the initiative and made an offer in spite of the 
fact that the 500,000 rifle limit had not been reached. Colt's most favorable offer 
was for $5,400,000 cash plus a 5% royalty on all rifles manufactured by other sources. 
A $10 credit per rifle was added, however, that would have eliminated any cash pay-
ment if outside production exceeded 540,000 rifles. This time it was the Aney that 
rejected the offer, again stating that it did not anticipate the need for that many M-16s. 
In January and May of 1966, two contracts were let for 100,000 rifles each, which 
put Colt's orders well over the 500,000 mark. The Army still did not press for manu-
facturing rights, this time giving the urgency of the Vietnam situation as the reason. 
In June, 1966, as a condition to a contract that would place Colt's orders over the 
600,000 mark, Colt and the Army finally agreed to negotiate. In December of that year 
the ArJIIY announced the decision to replace all .30 caliber weapons in the system with 
M-16's. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics indicated 
the magnitude of this decision by stating that the action would put the M-16 procurement 
program "in the hundreds of millions of dollars. "/13 . 
On 30 June 1967, an agreement was signed. For the M-16 manufacturing rights Colt 
received the following: 
l) $4,500,000 cash. 
2) 5-1/2% royalty on all weapons and spare parts manufactured by other sources. 
3) Co11111itment by the Army to purchase an additional 632,500 rifles from Colt for 
a total of 1,400,000 M-16's from Colt alone. 
The need for such an agreement was dramatically pointed out the following day when UAW 
local 376 struck at Colt. M-16 production was halted for a week until the strike was 
settled. 
In October of 1967 the House of Representative Investigating Corrmittee released 
its findings, many of which have already been noted. Another area criticized the amount 
of Colt's profits from the M-16. All contracts had been negotiated on a cost plus 10% 
basis, but, according to the co11111ittee, Colt's profits had been 19.6% in 1965, 16.8% in 
1966, and 13.4% for the first four months of 1967. The co11111ittee also questioned Colt's 
accounting system, the adequacy of their proposed costs, and co111>liance with certain pub-
lic laws. Colt agreed that their earnings and sales both reached record levels during 
the second quarter of 1967 but denied that any excess profits were involved. Colt argued 
that they had expended $5,684,000 on development costs for the M-16, which was only a 
potential major military weapon when the design was purchased from Armalite. GAO was 
asked to study the matter further. 
Armed with the newly purchased manufacturing rights, the Aney solicitied bids 
from 13 potential manufacturers for the production of two lots of 240,000 M-16's over a 
two-year period beginning in August of 1969. Four companies responded: Hydramatic 
division of General Motors with a bid for $56 million, Harrington & Richardson Co. (H&R) 
with a bid of $42 million, Maremont Corporation with a bid of $36 million, and Cadillac 
Gage division of Ex-Cell-O Corp. with a bid that apparently made them a competitor. At 
this point the Ar111Y decided that the timetable was too slow and that the contracts should 
be awarded on the basis of ability to begin production by February, 1969, rather than on 
cost. GM and H&R were awarded the two contracts. The price differential between the 
two companies was based on wage scale differences between Detroit and Worcester, Mass., 
and on the fact that H&R could retool their existing M-14 production line while GM had 
to start from scratch. 
/13 E. H. Harrison, 111s the M-16 Really Here to Stay?" American Rifleman, 
Februarj'71968, p. 45. 
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Senator McGovern criticized the decision to reject the lower Maremont Corp. bid, 
and Representative Ichord reconvened the special M•l6 investigating comnittee to look 
into the matter. In several respects, however. the ArR\Y'S decision appears to have 
been justified . Costs were lower than antici pated , and in Deceri>er of 1968 the con-
trac ts were "definitized" to $40.9 million for GM and $33.9 million for H&R. Both 
companies began production ahead of schedule. This and accelerated production by 
Colt allowed a seven month jump on reanning the South Vietnamese ArlllY and Popular Forces 
with the M-16 . 
Continuing Problems 
The M-16 seems to be destined to produce controversy . In September of 1969 the 
Arff\Y acknowledged that the M-16 would become the standard ri f le for all ArlllY cont>at 
troops. with the M-14 issued to nondeP,loyable administrative pers onnel and ROTC students . 
Thus ended a cycle that began with the M-16 as a limited issue weapon for special units 
and ended with roughly three million rifles produced. The Ar111Y•s decision also ended 
the NATO standardization that had begun a decade before under pressure from the U.S. 
The Wall Street Journal speculated that the Europeans would not follow the U.S. lead 
this tfme./14 Doing a little speculatin g themselves, however, three major European 
small arms producers have developed prototype 5.56 mm assault rifles from their stan-
dard 7.62 nm NATO models./15 Other nations have also expressed an interest in the M-16. 
In Septerrber of 1970 the South Korean government negotiated a contract with Colt for the 
right to produce M-l61s in Korea. 
The M-16 has not escaped the notice of various protest groups either. An article 
in the Wall Street Journal of 7 May 1971 contained the following item: 
A Stanford University student with a portfolio of x-rays showing skulls 
shattered by M-16 rifle bullets turned an otherwise uneventful Colt 
Industries, Inc. annual meeting into a debate over the company's role 
in supplying guns for the Vietnam war. 
In Noverrber of 1971 the Connecticut Citizen Action Group, a consumer group organ-
ized by Ralph Nader, charged that Colt was guilty of concealing defects in the M-16's 
that it produced. The group's 21 page legal style brief, titled 11The M-16, Colt ' s 
Lethal Lemon,11 stated that its purpose was to: 11 ••• focus attention on a most cruel 
and violent form of corporate subversion of the public and national interest ."/16 All 
that remains is for the Sierra Club to announce th~t the M-16 is somehow polluting the 
environment. 
/14 "M-16 Rifles to Replace Heavier Models for All Arff\Y Combat Troops." Wall 
Street Journal, 15 October 1969, p. 16. --
/15_ The firms are SIG of Switzerland. Fabrique National of Belgium and Heckler 
& Moch of West Gennany. 
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The following chronology was compiled from notices made at the time the contracts 
were awarded. Some contracts may possibly have been overlooked. but the purpose of 
showing the general trend of M-16 procurement has been accomplished. All contracts 
listed are by Colt unless otherwise indicated. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ} usually 
reports contracts in terms of dollars. and the American Rifleman (AR) in terms of 
nurooers of rifles. Infonnat1on from the two sources was occasionally conflicting. When-
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Date #Rifles 1 Value Source 
June 1968 $15,780,937 (WSJ) 18 June 68, p. 15 
Oct. 1968 $23,400,000 (WSJ) 7 Oct 68, p. 23 
1 Nov 1968 $13,300,000 (H&R) (WSJ) 1 Nov 68, p. 23 
$18,700,000 (GM) 
Nov. 1968 $30,300,000 (WSJ) 18 Nov 68, p. 15 
July 1969 458,435 $41,200,000 (WSJ ) 22 July 69, p. 2 
229,217 (GM) $23,700,000 
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"A camel is a horse which was put together by a conmittee. 11 Although this is a 
classic jest made by those who have been unsuccessful in the effective use of conmittees, 
a review of naval and other military organizations would make it appear that our past 
leaders have taken it to heart. The one man responsibility concept seems to be taken as 
a law of nature not to be tampered with. Though assignment of group responsibility and 
group actions is found within our organizational structure, it is quite sparse, and where 
it does occur, it is limited to the staff function. With the exception of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, which was so organized by Act of Congress in 1947, nowhere within the 
military structure is group responsibility assigned as a line function. The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were so organized to reduce defense inefficiencies caused by inter-service 
rivalry and, within the complexities of modern warfare and demands for improved resources 
management, to provide a broader base for high level military decision making. The 
efficiencies resulting therefrom over the past 25 years should be sufficient to convince 
anyone, but the hard line traditionalist, that line management by a group, a plural 
executive, so to speak, may be worth taking a look at. Certainly the demands placed upon 
the individual manager by rapid technological advancements, sophisticated systems analysis 
techniques. and unending financial frugality require every ounce of resources the modern 
manager can muster. There is certainly enough evidence available today in reports of 
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to indicate that we haven't as yet reached the 
apex of efficiency in management. 
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Excepting the past decade or two, the military commander/manager's role has been 
primarily one of on the scene decision maker. In a cont>at situation where human life 
and military victory may be in the balance, the areas of considerations and alternatives 
are rather narrow and, in maey cases, time is of the essence. Under such circumstances, 
there is a mandate for action by the single executive . However, times are changing and 
today, rather than being a purely military strategist or tactician, the naval military 
manager is finding himself in assignments ashore which are of a completely rlifferent 
environment than his traditional one. Today our organizational structure incorporates 
high level executive functions around the systems management concept. A concept which 
requires a much broader base for decision making than that of the traditional military 
strategist or tactician. Within the new environment, we have spend untold hours and 
dollars searching for pure technological and financial efficiencies. We must now cer-
tainly keep pace with improved management efficiency . Is it not time we throw off the 
yoke of tradition in military management and i nnovate? Is not the effectiveness of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff a strong case for attempting the plural executive approach to high 
level management? 
Before making a rash judgment in this area, let 1s subject the application of line 
co11111ittees (one whose authority involves decision making affecting subordinates respon-
sible to it) to some theoretical investigation. There is a considerable degree of con-
troversy about the plural executive concept. Protagonists are well supported on the 
issue that an executive conmittee is but an escape into irresponsibility and should 
never be supported. Yet, many advocates of the plural executive concept quote from 
experience cases where conrnittees holding executive responsibility have discharged 
their duties quite effectively and efficiently. 
Some may view the conrnittee as being too costly. Why pay three or more executive 
salaries rather than one? However, anyone taking a quick glance at the pay scales 
which we are paying civilian staff assistants for providing an area of expertise to 
our single executive will soon realize that in the long run, the plural executive may be 
considerably less costly. 
Inherent in any group action is the danger of co111>romise at the level of the 
least common denominator. This could prove to be not as strong and positive a course 
of action as that undertaken by an individual who has only to consider the facts as 
he sees them and then reach a conclusion. But then wouldn't the probability of making 
an incorrect decision be higher with the individual executive? 
Another aspersion toward the use of a plural executive concept is that it tends 
toward self-destruction. Behaviorists tell us it is a rare group of men who can par-
ticipate in the exercise of authority on a team basis. Almost invariably one man 
emerges as the l eader. But when an individual becomes dominant, the nature of the 
comnittee as a decision-making group of equals changes and there actually emerges an 
executive with a group of followers or advisors. When the plural executive ceases to 
operate as a group of equals and especially when it becomes a battleground for warring 
camps. the politics of the situation may lead to decisions or · reconmendations worse 
than the weak ones based on the least common denominator. 
One of the chief disadvantages of group action is the concept that responsibility 
is split and that since no one can practically or logically feel accountable for the 
group, no individual feels personally responsible for its actions. Also, since there 
is a tendency for groups or conmittees to seek unanimous or near unanimous conclusions 
or decisions , minority meni>ers are therefore in a strong position . 
The main weaknesses of the committee approach were sunmarized in 1936 by 
l . Urwicks writing in the British Management Review: 
11A conmittee differs from an individual in three important respects: 
Its corporate personality is intennittenti it dies each time that a 
session closes; it is not available between meetings to make the de-
tai led adjustments which are constantly necessary in translating 
policy into action. Being itself an organization, it postulates activi-





exercised by a chairman whose authority is also intennittent and whose 
responsibility is not personal and specific as would be the case with an 
individual. Its decisions can only be corrrnunicated to those responsible for 
acting on them in an impersonal form and almost always in writing. Thus it 
cannot have the personal contact with subordinates enjoyed by the individual." 
Thus far, we have only viewed the negative side of this challenging concept. 
Rather than attempting to counter the drawbacks to the concept, let's first examine 
what could prove to be significant benefits. We all remember the old adage "two heads 
are better than one." This simple truth forms the basis for one of the primary advan-
tages of the plural executive. The plural executive can bring to bear on a problem a 
wider range of experience that the single executive, a greater variety of opinion, a 
more thorough probing of the facts and a more diverse training in specialized aspects. 
Few problems fall entirely into a single area of comµetence such as engineering, produc-
tion, finance, etc. Most problems, on the contrary, are systematic and require more 
knowledge, experience, and judgment than any one individual possesses. Proponents of 
the single executive state that one can usually grasp ideas and reasoning quickly from 
a concise memorandum. However, is it not often the case that many high level decisions 
based on one page recorrmendations do not allow the single executive to judge the deci-
sion at all, let alone change it? (He doesn't even know whether all the important 
facts are presented to him.) Then there is the decision made on the basis of a highly 
stylized presentation which aims at getting a "yes" from the boss with a minimum of 
discussion--and that usually means a minimum of understanding on the part of the 
executive. 
One of the advantages of the executive judgment of equals is the stimulation of 
ideas resulting from the oral interchange of ideas and the cross examination techniques 
of the C0111Tiittee approach. Use of a plural approach further insures a more balanced 
judgment and normally one which can withstand intensified testing from all areas of 
concern. The dynamics of modern operations place a heavy burden on managers to inte-
grate plans and activities. The plural approach in coordinating planning and execution 
of programs within this type environment is most effective. 
After much research, renowned management heorist Peter Drucker in his work The 
Practice of Management goes so far as to claim that the role of chief executive should 
not be held by one person. He speaks of the "fallacy of the one-man executive." His 
arguments rest on the view that in large modern organizations there are always too many 
and diverse activities in the job for any one man. He states his opinion quite cate-
gorically: "There is only one conclusion; the chief executive job in every business 
{except perhaps the very smallest) cannot properly be organized as the job for one man; 
it must be the job of severa 1 men acting together. 11 
Now that we have scrutinized the pros and cons of the application of this concept 
O from a theoretical standpoint, let us take a close look at some actual experiences. 
While much experience exists in organizations with committees and with plural executives, 
the benefits of group management, as compared to individual management, have not been 
widely studied. However, the results of one study conducted by the American Management 
Association through interviews with executives and analysis of company records showed 
that the plural executive succeeds fairly well in helping to coordinate the activities 
of managers. It has a high potential for aiding in defining objectives, selecting alter-
nate ways of achieving them, and measuring the success attained. In terms of functions, 
the plural executive is thus especially useful in planning and in certain broader aspects 
of control. These generally encompass the areas with which high level management is 
concerned. 
Many of the world's large corporations have come to recognize the long range inef-
ficiencies resulting from broadening the load placed on the single manager as a result of 
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organization growth and diversification coupled with rapidly expanding technology and 
cost consciousness during the past quarter century. To compensate for this. several 
have turned to the use of line collllltttee executtve tn recent years. But one of the 
frontrunners in the use of the "management by executive colllllittee- concept was E. I. 
DuPont Nemours & Co. of Wilmington. Delaware. In an effort to provide more efficient 
management in spite of the demands of wider diversification and growth. DuPont seized 
the plural executive concept in 1921. The plural executive is composed of the presi-
dent and nine vice-presidents of the finn and is responsible for determining the broad, 
basic policies in operating the company. selecting the men to carry out the operation. 
and maintaining a continuous review of the business to insure that the men selected are 
doing a good job. Each member of the convnittee has equal status with one vote, inclu-
ding the president who usually votes only to break a tie. Split decisions are unconmon. 
When questioned concerning the advantages of the corrmittee-line system, DuPont execu-
tives stressed: 
The Strength and Security of Group Decisions·: The group is less likely to go 
to extremes since the colllllittee assures a balanced viewpoint in every issue. 
They feel that it may take longer to get action but it pays off handsomely in 
better decisions and the ability to follow through on long range policies. 
Objectivitt in Decision Makina: The system permits discussion and considera-
tion of po 1cy by men relieve of day-to-day decisions. and without subordin-
ate vested interests. Nobody on the co11D11ittee can be influenced by the effect 
of the decision on an operation for which he is responsible because the corm1it-
tee members are not responsible for operations. 
Continuity of Administration: The conmittee will nonnally change so gradually 
that management is always on an even keel. Whereas, when a specific single exec-
utive ceases to function, many times there are serious disruptions. The plural 
executive insures the organization of an averaging out of temperament and abi-
lity in top management. 
Development of Personnel: The committee approach accommodates a greater diver-
sity of executive talent. There is a place for the man who sings solo and also 
for the man who sings best in a chorus. Where there is decentralization at the 
top, there is initiative down the line. Other advantages briefly mentioned in-
cluded: increasing the stature of department heads, relieving part of the bur-
den which usually falls upon the chief executive. encouraging the resolution of 
problems at lower management levels, and flexibility. 
It is also interesting to note that the executives were at a loss for ready an-
swers when asked to list the disadvantages of the systems and were unable to cite any 
serious disadvantages. 
Although DuPont is singled out herein as an example of enthusiasm for the plural 
executive concept, it is by no means alone in its feeling. Standard Oil of New Jersey 
and Phillips Electric of Holland are but two additional users of this concept and have 
found it most effective. In addition, such giants as General Motors, U.S. Rubber and 
Sun Chemical utilize the executive conmittee at various levels within their organiza-
tions. 
When one stops to reflect, it is really the rare successful organization which 
operates on a one-man concept. The majority of successful top managers are, ·in fact, 
a team where two or more individuals, though not officially equal, work together as a 
team of co-equals in directing the operation of an organization. 
Whether the line committee has value then depends on the ability to maximize 






be accomplished best by building in two requirements to our plural executive structure. 
First, there should be no collective responsibility.(Each member should have assigned 
to him the areas in which he makes final decisions and for which he is responsible. 
Deliberation should be joint and decision single}. The second requirement would be 
that there be no appeal from one member of the plural executive to another. Whatever 
any one of them decides is the decision of all of top management. 
But what of our Navy today? Could we use some improvement in hi~h level manage-
ment efficiency? Now such concepts as systems analysis, concept fonnu ation, contract 
definition, life cycle costing, multi-year buys, integrated logistic support, total . 
package procurement, and others are making unbearable demands upon the chief execu-
tives of the organization. These are demands which cannot be adequately met by an 
individual. Are we ready to break the shackels of tradition with oraanizational 
innovation? Certainly the opportunit~ is there! Our systems comman ers, inventory 
111anagers, and the 1i ke are in a posi t1on much akin to that which triggered the search 
for new management echniques in industry and which ultimately lead to a widening use 
of line-committee management. Could not the Navy benefit if the Air System Command's 
chief executive was a line committee composed of technical, financial• and other man-
agement experts? Could we have better electronics spare part support for the dollar 
if the senior executive of the Navy Electronics Supply Office were, for example, an 
electronics engineer, a production analyst, and a top caliber business man perfonning 
as a plural executive? Could we make money with this concept in some of our lower 
echelon positions? 
The willingness to innovate has long been the taproot of success. As the envi-
ronment becomes more and more complex, the manager who recognizes the limitations of 
the single executive management and therefore applies the plural executive concept 
may well provide the success story for high level military management. 
, The challenge is there and in many of our large organizations there is nowhere 
to go but up! 
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Within the last fifty years the United States has found itself engulfed in two 
World Wars requiring the exertion of the full force of its military, indistrial and 
economic powers. And. twice within this same period it has found itself a protagon-
ist in limited wars. This paper attempts to analyze the efforts of the Federal Gov-
ernment to mobilize and control the nation's resources for the prosecution of these 
conflicts. I submit at the outset that these efforts have been slow to take effect, 
include many false starts, and reflect little realistic planning. I further submit 
that this nation inexplicably persists in making the same errors before. during and 
after each of the hostilities. 
In 1931, Bernard M., Baruch, financier. economist, advisor to Presidents and Chair-
man of the WWI War Industries Board, when testifying before the Congressional War Poli-
cies COlllllission said: 
" ... we must plan in such a way that, if war comes, we shall meet the enemy 
with our maximum effectiveness. with the least possible injury and violence 
to our people. and in a manner which shall avoid inflation and waste. Our 
plans should eliminate war profiteering and they ought to provide that each 
man. thing and dollar shall bear it's just proportion of the burden ... they 
should be said with full recognition that modern war is a death grapple 
between peoples and economic systems rather than a conflict of armies alone .• . 
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••• from my experience I am convinced that it i.s quite possible to pre-
pare, in peace, plans that will make the transition from Peace Industry 
to War Industry without serious disruption, to carry on the feverish 
industrial activity of war with the least possible hann to civilian morale ..• 
When we entered the World War. the frantic demands and uncoordinated 
counterbidding of our future associates in war had already distorted our 
own price structure ... In other words there was a robust inflation here 
before we ever entered the war. Furthennore, nearly twelve months elapsed 
after our declaration before we had evolved controls and organization capa-
ble of coordinating our own and our associates' procurement activities and 
of controlling price. "/l 
Mr. Baruch repeated these cornnents for more than 35 years following WWI. As 
Chainnan of the War Industries Board (WIB} during WWI he was charged with the res-
ponsibility for accomplishing the first mobilization of the nation's resources. His O 
conclusions stem from the situation he interited as Chairman and the many efforts of 
the WIB to correct and stabilize that situation. 
Prior to the advent of the WIB several federal boards had been created to gather 
infonnation and formulate mobilization plans. In 1916 the Naval Consulting Board was 
established to survey 18,000 industrial plants and to formulate a list describing and 
classifying important industrial establishments. Because the data requirements were 
unknown the effort proved fruitless. Also in 1916 the Kernan Board was established 
to investigate the feasibility of gover1111ent owned munitions, arms, and war equipment 
plants. Later that same year a Council of National Defense was organized to coordin-
ate industries and resources for the national welfare. All three boards were vague 
in concept and had little authority. In July 1917 the WIB was establ ished and replaced 
the Munitions Standards Board and General Munitions Board, both of which had been 
organized a few months earlier. The WIB was to investigate war industry needs, coor-
dinate means and methods of increasing production, study resources, fix prices, and 
establish a priority system. This was the first time a priority system had been con-
sidered. The WIB was haphazardly organized, weakly constituted and operated without 
adequate and accurate information. Then. in May 1918, President Wilson asked Mr. 
Baruch to assume Chairmanship and re-delineated the functions of the Board as follows 
(Appendix I also refers): 
1. Creation of new facilities and detennination of new sources of supply. 
2. Conversion of existing facilities as necessary. 
3. Conservation of resources. 
4. Advice to government purchasing agencies regarding prices to be paid for 
defense products. 
5. Detennination of production and delivery priorities. 
6. Purchases of war materials for our ~llies. __ _ 
Several conunittees were set up to carry out these functions. The Clear-
ance Conmittee was established to detennine those materials in which shortages 
were believed to exist and then clear them for release to industry. Within 
days, the committee was oveNhelmed and hopelessly back-
/l Bernard M. Baruch, American Industry in the War, ed. R. H. Hippelheuser 





logged. and a separate Prioritie~ COl1111ittee was established to handle distribution 
of those items for which a shortage actually existed. In spite of the now appar-
ently correct administrative machinery, the smooth flow of control was still hampered 
because-information regarding the requirements for types of materials needed to pro-
duce final products was not knoWtl. Mr. Baruch described the problem as follows: 
"All of these factors contributed to the difficulty of laying down a program 
of requirements. The separate units of the Army could not compute their 
requirements until they knew the size of the particular part of the Anny 
for which it was their legal duty to provide. The size of the Army to be 
here and abroad at any given time could not be easily computed without defi-
nite knowledge of the amount of shipping that would be available both for 
men and supplies. Frequently the kind of equipment could not be detennined 
until it was known what materials could be found available . .. "/l 
For instance, as late as the latter part of 1918, there was still no clear picture 
of what was needed in the way of types of steel for guns, machines, vehicles, etc. 
And, there was no accurate estimate of how many of each of these items were needed. 
As war production increased, several sections were added to the WIB to investigate 
additional available facilities and methods of stimulating production, to advise on 
plant extensions, and to examine areas for available manpower, transportation, plant 
capacity in use, etc. However, before this information was complete, the annistice 
was signed. 
One of the more specific problems confronting the WIB was that of labor. Labor 
turnover {job hopping) was high throughout the war. The problem became acute toward 
the end of the war as both government agencies and war contractors began to compete 
with each other and among themselves for labor. The existing federal labor boards were 
not equipped to handle the kind or magnitude of labor problem presented. Competition 
for labor caused wages to climb and the war was ended before a satisfactory scheme for 
"wage fixing" could be put into practice, even though the necessity for it had been 
obvious from the beginning. 
As one might expect, the lack of an adequate supply of steel was a continuous 
source of difficulty. This was one item that was in constant demand by our allie s , 
the government and the consumer. The great demand and scarce supply drove steel prices 
beyond an acceptable level. Finally. a freeze was placed on steel prices . For some 
time steel manufacturers delivered steel with a price to be determined at some future 
time by the government. Then, the situation was further aggravated as many manufac-
turers began to experience delivery delays due to a lack of transportation. At the 
conclusion of the war Mr. Baruch noted: 
" ... The early estimates were that only 17% of our enormous steel output (35,000,000 
tons a year) would be required to supply all war needs. When this estimate is 
reviewed in light of government control during 1918 of 100% of our steel, and i n 
light of the struggle to cover shortages which accompanied the control, one can 
realize the value which a peace-time bureau devoted to the collection of infonna-
tion might have had as a measure of preparedness.11/l 
ll .!,Qjsl •• p. 32. 
/1 Ibid . , p. 117. 
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In additton to a shortage of steel, tlie demand for copper and brass (due to the 
needs of our allies) was outrunnh'1g suppli"es for a full two years before we entered 
the war. Because the U.S . controlled the bulk of the world's copper, the basic pro-
blem here was one of sttmulattng producti"on. Frequently, copper, just as steel, was 
del ivered without pr ice, while the WIB attempted to arrive at a fair price. 
When it became apparent that a shortage of large machine tools was likely to 
be expertenced, the machine tool section of the WIB was fonned in October 1917. Unfor-
tunately the machine tool industry was late in being added to the list of manufacturers 
with a priority for vital materials . Producers of new materials often had inadequate 
information on which to base machine tool orders . The WIB, as a stopgap measure. began 
surveying private plants tn case machine tools had to be conmandeered. Fortunately, 
the war ended before this became necessary. 
One of the most incredible situations existed in the area of munitions, ordnance, 
and small arms. The WIB did not even create a division to handle this area until 
June 1918. Prior to the war, production of these items was restricted to a small 0 
number of plants situated in the eastern U. s. or near the Atlantic Seaboard. When 
the decisi on was fina l ly made to expand these industries, the congestion in the east-
ern manufacturing district had become very serious . Power, transportation, labor and 
fuel were all in critically short supoly. Clearly, had there been a central control 
over the distribution of orders and the expansion, this need might never have occurred. 
Additionally, there was litt l e expertise available in this country concerning the manu-
facturing of trench warfare weapons and, as a result, U.S. recruits, who trained for 
8-1/2 months before being sent to the front , were trained with wooden sticks. The 2 
million Americans who went overseas could not have been supplied with guns of U. S .• 
manufacture until the spring of 1919--two years after the declaration of war and six 
months after the armistice. 
We entered WWI without the advantage of past mobilization experience. We recog-
nized far too late the necessity for priorities, we allowed the purchasing of essential 
items to result in conflicting orders, and many essential conmodities could not find 
transportation facilities. Often, when rail transportation was utilized, the goods 
destined for France arrived at their point of embarkation only to find that shipping 
was unavailable. 
While different government supply activities competed against one another and 
continued to burden manufacturees with conflicting orders, these same manufacturers 
continued to grab at these orders knowing it was beyond their ability to fill them. 
Further complicating the situation was the force of political pressure exerted on 
government activities who awarded the contracts. 
Most detrimental perhaps, was the lack of current, accurate infonnation. At the 
beginning no one knew what or how much we had, where it was , nor how much more could 
be made available. More importantly, no one had any real measure of what we needed. 
No one saw the entire problem as one of finding the right raw materials and transpor-
ting those raw materials on schedule to the right manufacturers. All of this takes 
time, planning and, of course, control. Before we were able to accumulate this infor-
mation and, just when the WIB was beginning to be effective, the war was concluded. 0 
What did we learn from these experiences? The problems we faced did not go un-
recognized. In 1920, Congress updated the National Defense Act and: 
l . Authorized the Assistant Secretary of War to institute and take active charge 
of M-Day (mobilization day) planning and to conduct studies and fonnulate plans for 
the wartime mobilization of industry. 
2. Created the Anny and Navy Joint Munitions Board to coordinate the needs of 
the two services and thus prevent the disasterous competition for supplies which had 
crippled both services in WWI. 
In addition, Congress authorized the Army Industrial College as a supplement to 




The M-Day Plan was intended to avoid the fumbling and mistakes of 1917 by 
embodying our experiences from WWI and there6y eliminating a repetition of errors. 
Yet. in 1941, Mr. Hugh S. Johnson felt justified to write: 
" ... But a strange reversal of that (M-Day planning) policy has been 
applied to industrial mobilization. We went straight back to 1917, 
re-created the old Council of National Defense with its inept and 
amoebi"c Advisory Conrnission, and futlil1ed along for just as many months. 
The War Department mobilization plan was hardly even considered. Every 
fumble and blunder of the World War mobilization was repeated .•. The 
astonishing thing is that all of this precious time should have been 
lost. The encouraging thing is that there may yet be time and that all 
this experience will not be wasted forever."/! 
Mr. Johnson's accusations are serious and therefore bear closer scrutiny. It is 
important to understand what actually occurred in the intervening twenty years (1920-
1940) that gave rise to this indictment, and to detennine if such harsh words were 
in fact, justified. 
A complete picture of that 20 year period is not easily brought into focus. 
While the facts will speak for themselves, they must still be viewed with an under-
standing of the economic, political and social climate of the nation, for these fonn 
the frame of reference in which all else occurred. It is here then that we should 
begin. 
At the conclusion of WWI our industrial output had increased and the country 
was enjoying an unparalleled period of prosperity. At the same time, however, through 
various internal processes (i.e. taxation) we forced many of our war industries out 
of business. This prosperity (some called it "false") ended in the greatest depres-
sion this country has ever known. Our GNP dropped as much as 33% curing one year and 
at one point a total of one-fourth of our working force was unemployed. With the 
advent of President Roosevelt's "New Deal" and some innovative fiscal procedures we 
began to climb slowly from the depression. But it was not until after our entry into 
the Second World War that the economy actually recovered. 
With the signing of the WWI annistice, the people and the Congress of this nation 
turned their eyes inward - they had had all they wanted of "foreign involvement." The 
defeat of President Wilson's efforts to join the League of Nations coupled with our 
abdication of a leadership role in world·affairs, marked the beginning of the most 
severe isolationist period in our history. It is little wonder then, that the depres-
sion sweeping Europe had little meaning for us and that we overlooked the early warn-
ing signs of our future plight. Similarly, consumed with our own problems, we viewed 
only with slight interest the activities of Hitler and his massive armies as they be-
gan to literally swallow up small European nations. One of our few official acts, 
of an international concern, was the Neutrality Act of 1935 which placed an embargo 
on anns to all belligerants regardless of the justice of their cause. It was not un-
till September 1939 and then only after the fall of Poland that we began to slowly 
ann ourselves, but only as a means of avoiding war: Almost a year later, in June 1940 
when France fell after a few days of fighting, the nation was finally shocked into 
action and Congress passed the Selective Service Act. 
After a lengthy floor flight, Congress, by a very narrow margin, passed the Lend 
Lease Act in March 1941. This allowed the President to lend, lease. sell. or dispose 
of defense materials to ·any country whose defense he deemed vital to that of the U.S. 
Amazingly, it was not until November 1941, a few days before our entry into the war, 
that Congress finally repealed the Neutrality Act. 
The significance of President Roosevelt's New Deal must not be overlooked, for it 
caused almost a complete break between the Administration and industrialists, those 
Ii Ibid., p xi 
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same men whose cooperation we later needed to ensure our victory in WWII. It also 
split Congress and the Administration for they were at different poles on the New 
Deal and the President's international policies. Neither tne people nor Congress 
would believe, as late as November 1941, that we would for any reason become a party 
to the conflict in either Europe or the Pacific. Therefore our early efforts to 
mobilize for defense were halting and uncertain. Special political interests had to 
be placated, compromises affected and programs modified. It was difficult to organ-
ize a democracy steeped in isolationism and at peace for the eventuality of total 
war. The wealth of discussion, free expression of opinion, consideration of the mino-
rity point of view. and delayed acquiescence of the majority of popular opinion all 
consumed time and delayed decisive action. 
Of the situation, Mr. Francis Walton wrote: 
"A measure of the blame for the poor results of the Defense Production 
program must be laid to antagonism between Big Business and the New Deal, 
between management and the Political Experimenters, between Industry and 
the White House. "/i 
Throughout the 1930's. Congress and the people thought that the nation was 
ready at a moments notice to convert to a fully mobilized fighting machine. Much 
of this feeling was generated by the existence of the M-Day Plans worked out to the 
War Policies Commission. These plans purported to contain a design for industrial 
mobilization organized along the lines and experiences of WWI. It was also felt 
that with our self-sufficiency of resources, availability of raw materials would pose 
no real problems. Mr. Brooks Emeny. researching this topic for the Harvard Bureau 
of International Research, reported the following in 1934: 
"It is evident from our analysis that, of the 26 different commodities, 
the problem of procuring which in time of war is considered sufficiently 
difficult by the War Department to warrant their being classified as 
1strategic 1 • no more than 5 or 6 of these are really of vital concern •• . 
there is no question but what the purchase of a stockpile for war. adequate 
to cover a large protion of the probable industrial needs, should be 
made in the case of manganese, with lesser amounts of chromite and tin .•• 
in the case of rubber, the purchase of a stockpile appears unwarranted 
at present. 11 /§. -
C011V11enting further on the supply of rubber he said: 
"Rubber is by all odds the most important of the strategic raw materials 
belonging to the non-mineral group .•. it is indespensable to modern war-
fare ••• But on account of the size of our stocks on hand •.. and the progress 
which has been made in the development of adequate though more costly sub-
stitutes, our military position and security in case of war would be quite 
tenable, even granting a complete shutting off of nonnal imports. "II 
Of manganese, vital to the production of steel, and one of our most critical 
problems in WWI, Mr. Emeny said: 
/i Francis Walton, Miracle of World War II, (New York, 1956), p. 120. 
I§. Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials: A Study of America in Peace 
and War, (New York, 1934), p. 166. 






"There is no strategic mineral of the U. S. for which an absolute insur-
ance of supply in time of war is more essential than manganese ... National 
security necessitates, therefore, tfiat a guarantee of procurement of this 
vitally important strategic metal be assured in case of war. 11/~ 
This then briefly represents the backdrop for the events that elicited Mr. 
Johnson1s charges. A look at the events as they unfolded against this backdrop should 
complete the picture, for from a very meager start, we did produce 5,600 merchant ves-
sels, 79,125 landing craft, 300,000 war planes, 41,000,000,000 rounds of anrnunition, 
434,000,000 tons of steel, 126,839 gun carriages and armoured cars, 2,400,000 military 
trucks, and 2,600,000 machine guns by the end of the war./9 First let us examine the 
efforts to plan and organize between the time we began to arm ourselves for defense 
in 1939 until our entry into the war in December 1941. 
In total war it is impossible to separate the military, economic, and political 
aspects in matters pertaining to overall strategy and high policy. Only the President 
is in a position to coordinate all three. President Roosevelt, through the Reorgani-
zation Act of 1939, created the Executive Office of the President, giving him the 
Bureau of the Budget, the National Resources Planning Board, a White House Staff, etc. 
to assist in the coordination of these matters. However, it was soon proved that 
these bureaus, acting in an advisory capacity, were unable to cope with the situation; 
they just could not take theplace of responsible administrators holding delegated 
authority./10 One of the greatest difficulties facing the President was that of 
choosing mento direct the pre-war efforts. Of those few available, some were so 
antagonistic toward the New Deal that they could not be used, and still others could 
not adjust to thinking in national tenns and working within governnent procedures./11 
The highly touted M-Day Plans proceeded on four general assumptions: 
l. That overall control of the war effort must be in the hands of the President. 
2. That the administrative work of mobilizing for war production should be 
placed in a special war agency outside existing government departments and agencies. 
3. That this could best be accomplished by businessmen and industrialists 
recruited for this purpose. 
4. That a sudden transition from a state of peace to a state of war could be 
affected. 
The M-Oay Plans also called for a "War Resources Board" which the President promptly 
established in August 1939. Its report was never made public, however, either because 
the President considered it inadequate, or, due to the composition of the Board, it 
was in conflict with the New Deal Program. 
Soon thereafter, the President re-established the Council of National Defense 
(May 1940) which had existed prior to WWI. At the same time he created a National 
Defense Advisory Commission {NDAC) to work with the council. The NDAC was to concern 
itself with seven problems: industrial production, industrial materials, employment. 
agricultural production, transportation. price stabilization and consumer protection. 
Unfortunately the NDAC had no one person in charge and this led to considerable con-
fusion. Additionally, as an advisory body, they had no real authority. The ColTlllis-
sion did discover, however, that the M-Day plans lacked concrete data, contained the 
barest suggestion of procegures, and that they had to begin again. 
/J! 1.1>.ii, , p. 42. 
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The Off ice of Emergency ManageJl)eJlt tOEN) (Ma,y 19401 ijas pl aced in charge of most 
of the earl.y war agencies. As a part of the ExecutiVe· Offtce of the President, it 
was billed as an agency to advise tb.e Presi:dent in the di"scharge of hts extraordinary 
responsi"biltties hrought on liy-emergenctes. Its true purpose \rfiiS not announced be-
cause of the opposition to anything that htnted that the nation might be preparing 
for war. The NDAC, reporting to the OEN. was divided into two camps, one that thought 
the nation's plant capacity was adequate and the second which held that the productive 
effort required would mean increasing and converting facilities and curtailing civi-
lian output . Then, several months later. the Office of Production Management {Dec. 
1940) was created to increase defense production. fix priorities, and analyze defense 
needs. As prices began to rise and inflation set in, the Office of Price Administra-
tion and Civilian Supply was created. In August 1941 the Supply Priorities and Allo-
cations Board was established to iron cut the difficulties and conflicts of the other 
boards. None of these boards had the authority or the centra l leadership to be effec-
tive. Finally, five weeks after Pearl Harbor, the War Production Board (WPB) was O 
established. The board absorbed most of the other boards and continued to function 
throughout WWII. These then were our attempts to organize before the conflict. But 
exactly what was our status as far as available resources and production just prior 
to our entry into the war? 
This question could not be answered with any degree to certainty until far into 
WWII. Donald M. Nelson, the chairman to-be of the WPB, made an estimate of what we 
needed and what we had as of January 1940./lf. First he felt we needed a large and 
well equipped Army. He concluded that we did not have such an Anny and that. in 
fact, on 1 January 1940, when half of the world•s population was in an official or 
unofficial state of war invol ving more than one-half the area of the world, the U. s. 
had an Army inferior in size to that of Poland. Poland fell to the Wehrmacht in less 
than a month. He indicated that time was needed, time to decide that we needed a 
mass Army, time to convince Congress. and time to train the Anny in modern warfare. 
Second, we needed a strong Navy to protect our shores and our maritime interests. 
He concluded we had the best Navy in the wor ld at that point in time (Pearl Harbor 
and German wolf packs were still things of the future.} 
Third. we needed great reserves of military and industrial power. He concluded 
that few nations equalled us in this regard. But time was needed to convert facilities 
to war production and to train industrial manpower. 
Fourth, we needed a munitions industry. He concluded we had virtually none and 
that it would take time to build one. After WWI we had crecked down on the "munitions 
barons" who had developed their skills and resources to such a degree that they frigh-
tened the rest of the world and ourselves as well. Bethlehem steel, at the end of WWI. 
was making almost everything needed to throw at the enemy as well as everything needed 
to throw it with. Postwar taxes forced Bethlehem to physically destroy its whole muni-
tions empire. Remington, our biggest rifle manufacturer, similarly lost its biggest 
plant. Shipyards went out of business, the merchant marine dwindled to a shadow, 
machine gun plants and the beginnings of an air industry disappeared , and then we began 
to sink our warships. We did not begin to re-ann until a few months before entering O 
the war and this was mostly due to purchase orders received from our allies. 
Fifth, we needed raw materials. We had enough of some and not nearly enough of 
others. We again needed time to procure or synthesize the raw materials we lacked. 
The optimism formerly expressed regarding our raw materials situation was ill founded. 
Rubber and aluminum proved to be our big problems even before we entered the war. A 
lack of manganese caused a steel shor.tage throughout the early years of the war (this 




in light of the collJllon knowledge of its tmportance and the fact th.at ~e had the same 
problem in WWI). Even more tncredible, tn June 1939, Congress authortzed $100 million 
for the stockpiling of rare and essential conrnodtties, yet a year later this project 
had barely begun. Again, as in WWI, our macliine tool industry posed a problem. We 
had too few finns involved in this work and precision tools take time to make. Without 
them mass production is impossi'ble. Again the tmportance of this industry was not rea-
lized until well into the war. 
Within a few weeks after the fonnation of the Office of Production Management 
(OPM) in January 1941, it replaced the NDAC. Bernard Baruch was invited to speak to 
the collJllision about his WWI experiences. Mr. Baruch once again mapped out the problems 
encountered in WWI, explained the necessity for centralized control and the need for 
a priorities system, and price and wage controls. Mr. Nelson as coordinator of Defense 
Purchases for OPM before becoming the Chai nnan of the War Production Board was present 
when Mr. Baruch spoke and some years later conmented: 
~It is my opinion that hundreds of millions, perhaps billions, of dollars 
could have been saved and many headaches avoided if -his (Baruch's) 
recommendations had been adopted from the start ••• we are too slow in 
taking advantage of other men's experience. 11/ll 
The OPM had little more authority than did NDAC and Mr. Nelson believed that this was 
primarily due to the attitude of Congress and public opinion. It failed for the same 
reasons as NDAC--you j st could not convince people that the nation was about to fight 
a war. The steel industry resisted the possibilities of priorities or the need for 
allociations for months_. Congress delayed additional production because of disagree-
ments over where to put the plant sites. Mr. Nelson said later: 
"I have always believed that the virus which brought the agency (OPM) to its 
state of invalidism was its inability, or its unwillingness, to cope with the 
related issues of materials, priorities and allocations."/.l! 
Such was the situation on 7 December 1941. Mr. Nelson described the next five 
weeks, during which frantic efforts were made to organize for war, as follows: 
"It was not a process with which Americans were familiar ••• There was meeting 
after meeting, plan after plan, by the men who had been working on defense 
preparations for a year and a half, and by reinforcements which were gathering 
in Washington. Yet we all knew that there was something confused and aimless 
about our exertions; a lack of integration which tended to nullify the abun-
dant spending of energy. We knew that sufficient progress was not being made and 
that every minute wasted by us •.• was five minutes gained by •.. the confident 
enemy •.• We were in trouble. 11/1§_ 
At the end of this five week period the President decided to create the WPB and 
appointed Mr. Nelson its chainnan. Mr. Nelson was asked to draft his own Presidential 
Order for. the signature of the President, and the one he wrote clearly defined the 
powers and functions of the WPB. Thus a central agency with authority finally came 
into being. 
Ill Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
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Mr. Nelson and the WPB assumed responsibili .ty for converting the nati.on to a 
full wartime status. Their jo6 was threefold: 
1. To chart for our own forces and those of our all ies. the requirements for 
materials, men, and machinery for each part of tne economy. 
2. To ascertain exactly what our resources were, where they were located, their 
conditi on. and determine their adaptabi'l i ty. . 
3. To then match requirements against the resources and to balance the whole. 
Nelson recognized early in the game that all of this had to be accomplished without 
destroynng the basic system of free enterprise. The Divison of War Industry Opera-
tions of the WPB was responsible for operating the priorities system and for showing 
industry what had to be done--not hwo to do it. The Controlled Materials Plan. which Q 
came into being late in the game, assured industry of gettin g what they needed when 
they needed it. 
Under the circumstances, the achievements of industry and the WPB were almost 
miraculous. For instance, the entire automobile industry of some 30 manufacturers 
was almost 100% converted to the war effort. This had the effect of virtually destroy-
ing the entire automobile industry. They furnished 20% of the total war production 
including aircraft engines, tanks·, machine guns, diesel engines, and all of the 
Army's motorized vehicles. 
The WPB supervised the creation of over 81 shipyards at a cost of $500 million to 
the government. In 1939 we had 1,150 oceangoing vessel s. By 1945 we had 5200 large 
ocean-going vessels and innumerable smaller craft even though during most of the war, 
we lost more than we could build. 
Labor was recognized as one of our most important resources. At the outset of 
the war unemployment was high and there was a large reservoi r of people. Over five 
million unemployed men and women were classified by the U. s. Employment Service 
according to trades and skills. It did not take long for this reservoir to evapor-
ate. Training of civilian workers also posed quite a problem. A case in point is 
the large number of welders that had to be trained when it was discovered that the ships 1 
riveted plating could not withstand the exertions required during naval operations. 
The labor vacuum was eventually filled by women and Rosie the Riveter was born. Manu-
facturers were reluctant to hire women in positions that had traditionally been held 
by men and procrastinated for months before agreeing to accept women employees. Instead 
they continued to appeal to the Selective Service Boards to release male employees from 
induction. When this failed, they finally hired women. The problem of "job hopping" 
plagued all industries as it did in WWI. The WPB finally enacted measures partial ly 
'freezing' labor. The usual labor vs. management problems also existed, but to their 
credit, most of these were resolved locally with a minimum loss of production. 
The problem of finding people to run the WPB was resolved by hiring approximately 
300 'dollar-a-year' men from industry and civilian institutions. To their ceed1t. 0 
these men suppressed any antagonism they might have had toward New Deal policies . They 
managed to adjust to government procedures. stood up to public scrutiny and cri ticism, 
and functioned well in spite of the fact that Congress openly distrusted them. These 
men did a magnificent job. 
As in WWI, one of the biggest problems was determining requirements so that 
materials production and transportation could be properly scheduled. The WPB finally 
gained control of the this situation in 1943 but was hindered throughout the war by 
conpanies that persisted in hoarding materials . 
Unfortunately, the stabilization of prices and wages and the rationing of consumer 
goods were implemented too late to avert shortages and prevent and curb runaway infla-
tion. Once again, Mr. Nelson wished he had taken Mr. Baruch's advice and initiated con-




supply and demand controls. De~pite the delays, we managed to get the job done. 
The price paid by industry, th.e taxpayer, and the consumer was far htgher than 
necessary, and, if we had not had the time to get into gear. all of these sacrifices. 
willing and·unwilling, would have 6een useless. 
We learned many lessons from WWII • . first, we learned that there must be a mobi-
lization policy and a realistic plan to carry out that policy. Mr. Nelson said, long 
after the war, (as Mr. Baruch had after WWI}: 
111 believe it has been made plain that despite the setting up of various 
war age~c1es •.. we did not have adequate planntng for war until sometime 
after we were •in the thh:k of the Hght. 1111§. · 
Second, there must be an accurate, updated, information base from which to 
develop and implement these policies and plans. Two world wars have found this nation 
at a loss as to what we need, what we have, the location of what we have, and how much 
more we can get. 
Third, a centralized organization with sufficient authority must coordinate and 
control these efforts. In this way, needed actions (i.e. wage and price controls) 
can be taken early enough to prevent early shortages and damaging inflation. 
Fourth, as indicated by Mr. Johnson. it was clearly demonstrated that there is 
something to be gained from our past experiences: 
11When the record of industrial control in the war just concluded is reviewed 
against the background of the experience of the War Industries Board (1917-18) 
it is impossible not to be impressed by the extent to which history repeated 
itself ••. In spite of this similarity (of the problem) however, many of the 
mistakes in the administration of controls in 1917 and 1918 were repeated in 
1941 and 1942. Each new production or material control problem was approached· 
as if there were no fund of experience on which to draw. Time after time, the 
administrative and procedural blunders of the earlier years were reproduced in 
new settings. "Ill. 
After the conclusion of WWII, even with the cutback of war production, the general 
level of prosperity was maintained. During those few years preceeding the Korean 
conflict, history began to repeat itself. Our munitions industry dwindled, shipyards 
closed, ships were mothballed, and the siz~ of our armed forces was drastically reduced. 
There were some differences however. Neither Congress nor the people turned from 
international responsibilities. Public Laws 472 and 793 (1948) provided for government 
stockpiles of scarce materials in the amount of $3.7 billion. Unfortunately, at the 
outset of the Korean conflict, only 22% of this had been expended. 
Seymour E. Harris, Professor of Economics, Harvard, in regard to the ready 
supply of raw materials in 1950 wrote: 
"It is clear that shortages are serious. Unless adequate supplies of tin, copper. 
manganese, nickel, etc. are found, both the national economy and the mobilization 
will suffer. "Ill 
11§. Ib1d., p. 391. 
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Finally, the Defense Production Act of 1950 gave the President authority to fb 
wages and pric~s and detenntne priorities and make allocations of essential materials. 
Because Korea was limited actton, an all out war production effort was not required. 
A Mobilization Director was appointed 6ut had ltttle authority . Eventually, wage and 
price controls were instituted and a skeleton control system was esta6lished. Before 
the outbreak of hostil-1ties the economy was close to full employment (about 5% of the 
labor force was unemployed); therefore prices clim6ed rapidly and controls were needed 
to curb inflation. This time the delay tn enacting wage and price controls directly 
contributed to the recession this country experienced at the conclusion of the conflict. 
Additionally, the limited control policies introduced were weak, inadequate, and 
unenforced. All of this gave rise to Mr. Harris 1 conclusion that we did a much poorer 
job of controlling resources during Korea than during WWII. Much of this failure is 
once again directly attributable to lack of planning and inadequate authority. But here 
too, a new element was introduced. He said in part: O 
11As difficult as it was to enlist adequate controls in WWII, it will be much more 
difficult to mobilize them in the fifties. I do not mean paper controls. but con-
trols that are acceptable and enforceable. With the country short of full mobili-
zation and the crisis of uncertain duration, the fist-pounding type of controls 
will not prove very effective. With the public reluctant to abide by regulations, 
the only way out would be a stabilization gestapo for which the American people 
are certainly not prepared. 11 /~ • 
The war was not particularly popular and people as a whole did not feel compelled to 
abide, at least strictly, with the limited controls imposed. They felt that the war 
industry was taking too big a bite from consumer production and too much government 
spending was being applied to the war effort. 
At the cessation of the hostilities this country once again reduced its Armed 
Forces, dismantled a partially rebuilt war machine and began to look upon foreign entan-
glements with increasing suspicion. 
Between 1952 and the Viet Nam build-up in 1965, an old and familiar pattern began 
to evolve. Defense production and milit ary procurement once again became a partisan 
political issue. In 1952, RADM R. L. Long, USN, Acting Vice Chairman for Supply Manage-
ment of the Munitions Board described for the House Armed Services C0111nittee the pro-
blems which various procurement policies posed for the individual procurement officer: 
11Congress has enunciated a small business policy. Mr. Wil son has issued a direc-
tive ... which says, 'Let 1s give special attention to distressed areas.• We have 
a big programof offshore procurement. We have a statute called the Buy-American 
Act. We have today •.• at least 14 major policies under which your purchasing officer 
today is working .•• there are factors which are going to affect every single pro-
curement that is made. Yes, you have price control . Yes, you have people who 
would say, 1Negotiate all your contracts so that you can direct your contracts to O 
small business or to a distressed area . • You have also got a committee of this 
House, a conmittee of the Sensate, select committees on small business •.. If you 
would ask me today. if I were a purchasing agent, which one of these directives 
I would follow, I would tell your(sic), sir, that I would follow the one on which 
the pressure was the greatest right now, and then duck."/20 
/.!i Ibjd. • p. 17. 
/20 William L. Baldwin, The Structure of the Defense Market 1955-1967, (Durham, 





In 1963 Seymour Melmar. Columbia University, e~timated that the machine tool 
stock of the U. s. was older th.an t~t of any other industrialized nation./,ll 
In 1964 we began to buildup our operations in Viet Nam. The initial requirements 
for military hardware were easily met 6ecause of large tnventories and the available 
capacity. Neither wage and price controls nor production controls were instituted. 
We failed to face the problem of prior1ttes and manufacturers soon could not meet dem-
ands for real output for non-defense use. The failure to take steps to restrain civi-
lian consumption and government non-defense expenditures caused open competition for 
products; thus raising prices arrd causing severe inflation. 
Like Korea, this war too is unpopular. Perhaps one of the reasons for its unpo-
pularity is the inflation which has resulted . As the war effort increased more war 
materials were required and the government once more found itself competing with the 
consumer. Prices and wages both began to rise. As prices increased, the government was 
spending more and more for war materials and less for domestic projects. There is no 
logical explanation for the failure once again to initiate some kind of responsible 
controlling measures. 
As before, we found ourselves in a shooting war with an ill-equipped and short-
supplied fighting force. We were forced once agi:in to spend great amounts of money to 
hurriedly procure ships, landing craft, and other war items in sufficient nllllbers to 
handle our needs. The buildup took time and it was expensive. 
As we withdraw from Viet Nam we find the beginnings of a new call for isolationism. 
We find antagonisms over policies between the administration and Congress. There are 
great pressures to reduce defence spending and research and we have scrapped obsolete 
ships with no plans to replace many of them. Manufacturers of war materials are under 
great pressure and many of them are disappearing from the business scene. We are 
yearly reducing the size of our anned forces and pressures are being exerted to 
withdraw from our standing international agreements. What then are our plans and pre-
parations for future mobilization? 
In 1963 the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) (see Appendix II) rec011111ended the 
establishment of a standing agency. the Office of Defense Resources (ODR), to oversee 
Federal efforts for full scale mobilization. Accordingly, in 1964 ODR was established. 
Then in July 1966, the OEP furnished a Reserve Mobilization Plan for Limited War. The 
principles of the plan include the idea that concurrent with our physical survival will 
be the survival of our basic value system. OEP has a "ready draft" of the "Defense 
Resources Act" to submit to Congress for their approval should we have to mobilize. 
This act provides authority for price and.wage stabilization, expansion of productive 
capacity, etc. Mr. Baruch strongly urged the OEP to secure standby legislation in 
advance of an emergency and thus avoid delays from Congressional debate at a critical 
period. But it remains in draft form with the hope that Congress will approve it 
quickly. If Congress delays we may find ourselves once again well into the fighting 
before being able to effect vital controls. 
The ODR (see Appendix III) will be the staff arm of the President. The Director 
will be named by the President when the agency is activated and will direct and coor-
dinate the entire resource mobilization effort . The OEP will be abolished and its 
personnel transferred to the OOR. 
The Director of the ODR will be assisted by the Defense Resources Board. This 
Board will be composed of the heads of Federal Agencies having mobilization responsi-
bilities (e.g. Department of Labor). The development of each particular program will 
rest with the agency responsible for putting it into effect . The ODR will provide 
the necessary policy guidelines and directions. The basic plan does not call for 
additional personnel in these agencies. In both World Wars standing Federal Agencies 
Ill Ibid. 
33 
were unequal to the magnitude of the additional tasks imposed by mobilization. I 
suggest that it .is very likely that this same sttuatton could occur again. 
During an emergency every major production and servtce sector of the national 
economy would be assigned to some Federal Deparbnent or Agency which will be known as 
the controller or resource agency. Durtng a declared emergency the resource agencies 
would have the power to regulate and control to a much greater degree than that implied 
in their statutory peacetime roles. Again, the responsibility is placed with an exis-
ting agency, and the additional workload wi"ll lie superimposed on an already heavy rou-
tine workload. No provisions are made for an information base. All data will come 
from "current stattstical data." We will once more find ourselves with much useless 
information. It has been proven repeatedly that mobilization information has never 
been available fr(jll normal or currently available statistical data (i.e. how many 
tanks can 15 automobile manufacturers produce in the first year?) 
So, in 1971 we find ourselves with a paper agency. This agency will function if 0 
and when Congress passes the appropriate legislation. I cannot help recalling that 
Congressional legislation was a problem in both World Wars. We find the nation rely-
ing once again on existing Federal Agencies to accomplish both the mobilization and con-
trol of resources when this system has failed twice in the past. There are no pro-
visions for gathering the very information upon which a successful mobilization is 
predicated. We have yet to take positive action to acquire stockpiles of vital war 
materials. 
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that in the past sixty years we have 
indeed made little progress and that we are dedicated to the repetition of certain acts. 
Given the world situation, we are today no better prepared than we have been in the 
past. 
The one remaining issue is that the plan described above is one which will become 
effective during a limited conflict and will be expanded as required. But to date, this 
nation has no plan for total resource mobilization because it is felt that recurrence 
of a long drawn out conflict on a major scale requiring total resource mobilization 
would seem to be almost inconceivable./22 
Mr. Avery E. Kolb, Executive Officeof the President, said: 
"Although existing mobilization plans provide for direct controls no statutory 
authority exists today for bringing them about. Bernard M. Baruch and Senator 
H. E. Capehart pointed to this problem in 1953 when they sought to retain, on a 
stand-by basis, the control authority vested in the President by the Defense 
Production Act of 1950. To be effective, authority for direct controls must be 
available in advance so as to be applied with a fine sense of timing. The general 
atmosphere of 1968, however, was such that the President would hesitate to ask 
for, and the Congress would be reluctant to give, powers of direct economic 
control. Should the nation approach those levels of danger where dynamic and 
positive action may be required. there is concern that the government will not 
be able to act or will not move to act in time ... "/23 0 
Some of the oldest religious writings record that a man named Baruch helped 
Nehemiah rebuild the defenses of Jerusalem. Generations later a man named Baruch 
repeatedly exhorted his king to prepare for an invasion. The king refused, and when 
Baruch persisted, publicly burned the scroll containing the warnings. Baruch later re-
wrote it from memory and hid it so that it could not be destroyed. He, however, contin-
ued to repeat his warnings up to the end of the bitter disaster. Hundreds of years 
later another man named Baruch repeatedly warned his government regarding the defenses 
of his country and he too has been ignored. 
/22 Avery E. Kolb, Emergency Resource Management-Limited War, (Washington, D.C. , 
1969). 
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Tact. repression of aggressive tendencies, and personal restraint are generally 
held to be marks of the "well-bred" individual by our society and, indeed, by prac-
tically all advanced cultures in the world. It would be hard to imagine living 
comfortably in a society where all members freely and openly expressed their opinions 
concerning the dress. mannerisms and general carriage of the people with whom they 
came in contact. These opinions do exist as the content of any past cocktail 
party monologue by the typical American wife will reveal. Fortunately, however, such 
feelings are rarely verbalized to any but the most trusted companion! 
This fact contributes to harmonious relations in our society and certainly few 
people would desire this tendency to change. However, there is a certain deleterious 
effect on co11111unication as a result of the "masks" that we all wear. As we pass 
through our daily interpersonal relationships. we are rarely fully aware of the effect 
our actions have on those with whom we come in contact. · Conversely, we leave these 
same individuals in the dark with regard to how they "come - on" in their relation-
ships with us. Of course, we all get some feedback; the boss or professor provides 
a portion. but this is usually performance related. On the more subtle side, we may 
feel that we are not getting optimum perfonnance or receiving a high degree of loyalty 
from our subordinates, but we are usually at a loss as to why. To quote an advertise-
ment by a toothpaste company several years back seeking to cure hal1tosis in the U.S., 
"even your best friend won't tell you!" In general, then, we are all basically amiable 
people who are conscious of the feelings of others. and this attitude will not likely 
change. 
3 9 
However, during the past ten to ftfteen years there seems to be a movement by 
many people to strive for a more open, down to earth post ure tn their interpersonal 
rel ationships. To achieve this goal, many have turned to a relative ly new thera-
peutic method known as encounter groups. These groups are known by other names such 
as sensitivity groups, T - groups, maratnon groups, and self-study groups. They take 
on a variety of forms from brief one hour discusston groups to non-verbal "do-your-
own-thing11 sessions to two to four day marathon sessions involving a minimum of break 
in continuity of group interaction. 
The idea of sensitivity training , or encounter groups, is actual ly about twenty-
five years old and was reportedly discovered by Kurt Lewin./1 In 1946, Lewin and 
several colleagues were involved in developing a group relatTons training program 
for Connecticut State employees and one evening were discussing the progress of the 
trainees. Three of the trainees innocently came upon the meeting and asked if they O 
could listen in on the proceedings. Lewin admitted them and the discussion went on 
as if the three trainees were not there. When the progress and behavior of one of 
the trainees present came up and a disagreement among the training staff ensued, the 
trainee became extremely excited and proceeded to relate her interpretation of what 
had actually occurred during the particular session in question. Lewin was apparently 
so impressed with the candidness of the confrontation and the factual data the discus-
sion provided that he and his colleagues felt encounters such as these had enonnous 
potential in the field of group therapy and warranted further study and devel opment. 
It actually has been in the last seven to ten years that encounter groups have 
become popular as the following statistics reflect./Z 
Sponsoring Group 
Esalen 
National Training Laboratories 
Tavistock 
Approximate Participation 







The budget of the National Training Laborator ies {NTL) has grown from a modest 
$300,000 in the early 1960's to approximately $3,000,000 during the latter port ion 
of the period. Further, as of 1970, NTL had 150 separate sensitivity training pro-
grams. Carl Rogers sums up the surging i nterest in encounter group therapy with the 
following quote: "It is a fascinating fact that with almost no support from univer-
sities, little recognition from academic peopl e, and no support from government grants 0 
basic encounter groups have become the most rapidly growing psychological trend in our 
culture. "/1. 
/l Back, Kurt W. "Sensitivity Training: Ou_e~tions and Quests." 
Personnel Administration, Jan - Feb '71, Vol 34 (1) ~- 22. 
11 Monthly Labor Review, Dec •10, P•. 13. 
/3 Bach, G. R. , "Marathon Group Dynamics: I. Some Functions of the 





It is important to note that group therapy of the encounter var1ety is not tor 
the mentally diseased. Groups are comprised of col 1 ege students. management and super-
visory personnel. religious leaders, educators, and special sessions for married cou-
ples./! Particularly significant has been the curiosity in this form of personality 
and management development by American industry. Of the 150 current National Training 
Laboritories programs. thirty-six have been explicitly developed for business execu-
tives./i Several years ago, the American Management Association (AMA) instituted an 
Executive Action Course,three weeks in length.patterned after sensitivity training 
methods. In addition, the AMA's President's Association has developed a course for 
chief executives of firms and recently launched the "Presidents' Lab for Wives"./6 
Organization development departments are springing up in many U.S. firms, and, as of 
1970, 10,000 behavioral scientists are on corporate payrolls./I Following a survey 
of basic encounter group methods, fonnat, and results, a review will be made of the 
use of sensitivity therapy in industry and its adaptibility for the industrial setting. 
My research for this paper indicates that most practicing psychotherapists are in 
favor of the encounter group approach. Arthur Burton speaks of the somewhat limited 
interchange that often typifies individual therapfst/client treatment in the following 
quote: "The limits set on acting-out, loving-out, and living-out, the careful guard-
ing of the theraptst's own person, the rigid temporal parameters, the hush-hush con-
spiracy about money, the authoritariani'sm of the interpretation, the morality play, 
among others, have always been covertly resented by the client . 11 /~ He goes on to 
state that during the encounter sessions these barriers are thrown out as the patient 
gradually overcomes his initial reservation and joins with his group members in the 
dynamics of open interpersonal communications. George R. Bach refers to this phenome-
non as "psychological fertility"/9 and credits group pressure, rather than individual 
psycho-therapeutic efforts, as beTng the primary vehicle in moving clients toward open 
honesty and spontaneity in interpersonal relationships./10 Frederick H. Staller sees 
the goals of encounter groups therapy as 11growth and change, new behavioral directions, 
the realization of potential and a heightened self awareness." He views the marathon 
or encounter group as more effective than individual psychotherapeutic sess i ons in 
increasing the individual development progress because of the interpersonal contact, 
crises, and free exchange of views between members that characterize the encounter 
group.fl]__ ' 
Before going further, it would be well to survey the operations of the typical 
encounter group and relate this to the benefits derived from such experiences by the 
participants ·. The marathon group will be used as the basic guideline as it is felt 
to be the most valuable of the group therapy methods because of its length. Bach feels 
Ii Burton, A. , Encounter, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Inc. 1970, p. 9. 
/'i Berkwitt, G. J., Behavioral Science, Is the Cure Worth It, Duns Review, 
May 1970, vol 95 (5), p. 39. 
/§. Ibid, p. 40. 
II Ibid 
/§. Burton, A. Ibid, p. 12 
/'l._ Bach, G. R. , The Marathon Group: Intensive Practice of Intimate Interaction 
Psychological Reports, June 1966, vol 18 (3}, p. 998. ' 
/10 Ibid, p. 995. 
/11 Burton, op cit, p. 3. 
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that in the shorter (one to four) hour group encounters, many participants never reach 
the level of confidence and group trust that penn1ts them to openly vent their emotions 
/Jl. In the longer sessions, clinical evidence shows that practically all participants 
shed their masks and roles, either as their confidence builds or through group pressure 
to cooperate and open-up./]l 
The marathon ~roup generally consists of from ten to fourteen members who pay any-
where from $90 to $300 for a concentrated two to four day session, usually held in a 
secluded setting. As a general rule, one or two leaders or facilitators are present 
to provide minimum guidance to the group. 
Usually the group is faced with no agenda and little or no guidance from the 
leader. This is an unnerving experience in itself but leads the group through a series 
of reactive phases culminating in open exchange of feelings which is best sunvnarized by 
Carl Rogers:/.li 0 
1. Milli ng Around - The leader announces that the group has unusual 
freedom and that he will take no directional leadership. As the 
group introduces themselves and searches for an agenda, frustra-
tions develop, members are often ignored as they atteinpt to launch 
the group onto a subject, and the leader ts frequently attacked 
for his passive position in t he group. 
2. Resistance - As the group enters this phase, some members may 
attempt to reveal a personal feeling, but there is general mis• 
trust among group members which is quite apparent to the exper-
ienced observer. 
3. Recalled Feelings: At this stage, the barriers to complete open-
ness are still apparent, but many members begin to reveal feelings 
about people and situations outside of the group. Negative feed-
back begins to develop at this stage. 
4. Reveal ing Self: This is the beginning of effective encounter as 
a member sees that the negative reactions experienced during the 
RECALL phase actually did no hann. He begins to feel a part of 
t he surge of the group toward openness. People also begin to 
realize the effect they have on the other members. 
5. Here-and-Now Trust : At this stage, the feel i ng of freedom 1s at 
its height and members enter into the previously avoided area of 
revealing personal opinions about others in the group. The group 
is now thoroughly embroiled in the desired intimacy of i nter per-
sonal relations. 
Rogers mentions other level s and ancilliary outputs or developments, but the 
above list serves to depict adequately the progress of the typical encounter group. 
/R Bach, op cit, p. 995. 







The basic goal of marathon group therapy is to provide a learning experience 
whereby the individual can become more transparent, can increase his capability to 
level or be frank with those witn whom he comes in contact, and can develop the 
ability to expose his inner self to group pressure and tnfluence. Having coped 
with these rather new sensations, his real value from the experience comes from 
his realization of how hec~ffects other mem6ers in the group and the ability to 
practice new or different types of behavior on the group members./15 As mentioned 
earlier, little direct psychological feedback is received in the daTTy routine of 
our 1 ives. But if the group successfully reaches Rogers' 11Here-and-Now Trust 11 
plateau, the individual member receives constderable feed6ack as to how he inter-
relates with society. It does not take long for co11111ents to develop like: 11The 
trouble with you, Johnny, is that you have no guts. 11 111 took an instant dislike to 
you the first moment I saw you." "I like your warmth and your smile." 
The group leader or facilitator usually takes on a passive role, leaving the 
group to develop the agenda and general dialogue. 
The writings reviewed all stress that effective therapy in the marathon group 
is only reached when the discussions center on the 11here-and-now11 orientation. 
This is a difficult stage for most individuals, and thus, the group, to attain. 
We are not accustomed to shartng our emotions freely and even less given to complete 
and open frankness. How then can the group gravitate to the level of sharing where-
by each member can gain a clearer understanding of himself as well as improved inter-
personal skills? 
To begin with, marathon group members must have a sincere desire to make signi-
ficant changes in their customary ways of behaving and acting in their real-world 
surroundings./}.§. Further, they must be willing to expose their personalities to 
others ./JJ_ Surely, without this joint desire among group members, the group would 
be fortunate to arrive at Rogers' "Recalled Feelings" level. Bach effectively cites 
the necessary desire of group members in the following quote: "The Marathon group-
therapeutic experience is most fully effective with those who wish to exchange their 
own ways of acting and being in this world and who are ready to quit blaming others 
and environment for their present unsatisfactory lot."/18 
Given that a particular marathon group is comprised of individuals who sincerely 
desire to change their interactive behavioral patterns, some participants still have 
difficulty in shedding the social mask that they maintain in their real world contacts. 
Dialogues taken from marathon sessions show that group pressure is at first tender, 
but later often develops into angry, aggressive insistence. This is the most success-
ful means by which an individual member is forced into the open. Usually the reticent 
member is attacked for not cooperating with the group's effort to get to the heart of 
the matter with regard to interpersonal dialogue. Not only does the aggressive dimen-
sion facilitate complete participation of all group members, but it is generally felt 
to be helpful in all phases of communication in the successful encounter group. Bach 
and Hart developed ten adjective-dimensions of helpfulne~s in group encounter, and 
incorporated them into questionnaires designed to elicit descriptions of persons cate-
/15 Bach, G. R., The Marathon Group: Intensive Practice of Intimate Interaction 
Psychological Reports, June 1966, p. 996. 
/.!§. Bach, G. R. Ibid, p. 998. 
/JL Glueck, W. f. Ibid, p. 504. 
/1.§. Bach, G. R. Ibid, p. 998. 
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gorized as "most helpful 11 and "least helpful" in the optnion of recent marathon 
group members./,ll! The adjective-dimenstons are cited below: 
Most Helpful 
1. Empathetic Identtftcatton (similarity) 
2. Acceptance-wannth (affectionate inclusion) 
3. Self-Understanding (tnsight mediation) 
4. Problem Solving (realtty orientation} 
5. Aggression-Confrontation (conflict acceptance} 
Least Helpful 
6. Strangeness (unlike me) 
7. Non-Caring Indifference (alienation) 
8. Narcissism (artistic preoccupation) 
9. Disjunctive Co11111un1cation (irrelevance) 
10. Aggression-Phobia (conflict evasion) 
One-hundred and twelve fonner marathon group participants responded to this 
questionnaire. The respondents were requested to indtcate how others in the group 
were most or least helpful to them as well as how they felt they were most or least 
helpful to others in the group. Aggression-confrontation was ranked second among 
the behavioral dimensions in the category of most help given to others. Aggression-
phobia or conflict evasion, on the other hand. was ranked highest among the least 
helpful dimensions exhibited by others in the group and a close second when descri-
bing the respondents own least helpful tendencies./20 Apparent1y, then, as repug-
nant as over-aggression is in our society, it is felt to be a necessary vehicle in 
eliciting effective interchange during encounter group therapy. 
As the social masks are finally shed by all, or most members, the group can 
now get down to realistic exchange of feel ings. The open frankness and brutal 
truth that characterizes the balance of the session ts dia logue is what leads to the 
true value of the encounter experience. 
0 
from my research. it appears that the frankness and honesty that each group mem-
ber eventually portrays allow the group to see and experience the true personality · 
or psychological inner-core of ·each individual. The reactions of the other group 
members to the candidly displayed inner -self of the indivi dual member gives the mem-
ber the necessary feedback as to how other~ in society perceive him. He may be 
rebuked for his bullish tendencies, chastised for his reticence, or praised for his 
positive qualities. At any rate, the i ndividual leaves a successful group encounter 
anned with an honest appraisal of how he affects other people, a realization of those 
personality traits which others find offensive, and perhaps even a renewed confidence 0 
in his capabilities to provide wannth and satisfaction to others. 
The effect of marathon encounter sessions on personality was investigated recently 
by J. f. Guinan and M. L. Foulds./21 In formulatin~ their study, they developed two 
groups of ten college students (6 male and 4 female). The authors administered the 
/19 Bach, G. R. , Marathon Grou D namics: II Dimensions of Hel fulness: Thera-
peuticAggression, Psychological Reports, June 1967, vol 20 3-2 • p. 1149. 
/20 Bach, G. R., Marathon Grou D namics: III Dis'unctive Contacts Ps cholo i-
cal Reports, June 1967, vol 20 3-2. p. 166. 
/21 Guinan, J. f . and Foulds, M. L. , Marathon Group: Facilitator of Personal 




Personal Orientation Inventory (POI} to each group of ten students, then immediately 
subjected one of the groups to a weekend~long marathon session. The second group 
received no treatment. following the marathon session, each group was again given 
the POI. The group which had attended the marathon session exhibtted positive changes 
on all twelve scales of personality measures. Signiftcant positive changes were shown 
on seven of the twelve scales. The control group, on the other hand, showed no sig-
nificant variability between the two admintsterings of the test./22 The findings led 
Guinan and Foulds to conclude: "The structure of a marathon provldes an excellent 
opportunity to observe and measure the tmpact of a therapeutic experience, and future 
studies may shed light on the process of change in those persons who are in groups 
and on the process of psychotherapy 1n general. 11/23 
If a particular marathon group is able to achieve the level of openness and co-
operation it seeks, a great deal of group cohesiveness should develop. The possibi-
lity of group rejection is often feared by participants if they reveal an embarrassing 
phobia or fetish. However, the groups' general drive for intragroup honesty actually 
serves to welcome or reinforce efforts by individuals to bring out problems which have 
been hidden burdens within their personality structures. The helpfulness that an 
individual _receives from the group is genuinely appreciated. A quote from a letter 
written by a fonner marathon group member to the group leader typifies the feeling 
of the majority of marathon group participants concerning the helpfulness of the group 
co-members,i "The strength that you all gave me is still very vivid in my feelings and 
I am also trying to soak up the idea that Margaret (the writer} is a lovable and loving 
person."/24 
R. R. Dies and A. K. Hess sought to investigate this cohesion developed during 
encounter group therapy attempting to test the hypothesis that the compression and 
intensity present in encounter group therapy sessions heightened the degree of inter-
personal relationship and led to a greater group cohesion./25 They prefaced their 
study with a remark that the general enthusiasm for marathon encounter group therapy 
had not been matched by a similar degree of empirical study regarding the psychologi-
cal results of encounter on fndividual participants'personality traits./26 A similar 
observation had been made by Guinan and Foulds./27 To test their hypothesis, Dies 
and Hess divided male post-narcotic patients intosix groups of five members each. 
All males had voluntarily requested psychotherapeutic treatment . Three of the six 
groups were subjected to one twelve hour marathon session while the other three atten-
ded twelve one hour conventional group therapy sessions . The patients were asked to 
complete experimental measures designed to reflect their assessment of the cohesive-
ness of their respective groups. Further, the first, fourth, eighth, and twelfth 
hours of both the conventional and marathon sessions were tape recorded by the exper-
imenters. Ranking of the taped portions of the sessions revealed that both a higher 
feeling of cohesion on the part of group members and a higher verbalized manifesta-
tion of group cohesion was evident in the three groups undergoing marathon therapy. 
It was also shown that in both the conventional and marathon groups, but particularly 
in the marathon sessions. the index of cohesion increased directly with hours of 
/22 Ibid, p. 147. 
/23 Ibid, p. 148. 
/24 Rogers, Carl, Ibid, p. 60, 
/25 Dies, R. R. and Hess. A. K .• An Experimental Investigation of Cohesiveness 
in Marathon and Conventional Group Psychotherapy, Journal of Abnonnal Psychology, 
vol 77 (3), p. 258. 
/26 Ibid. 
/27 Guinan, J. F. and Foulds, M. L., Ibid. 
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exposure./ 28 
The group encounter does seem, then, to 6.e of signifi:cant value to the partici-
pant if he enters the experience with a stncere desire to gain an enriched evalua-
tion of his interactive capabilities. Further, he must have an open minded interest 
in gaining increased insight into the drives and inner motivations of others within 
his realm of society as typified 6y his group co-mem6ers. If the member is able to 
accept it, the brutal attacks and frank opinions he receives from hi s co-members 
serve to motivate him towards changing his accustomed behavioral traits because he 
receives quite candid feed6ack regarding the impression his interpersonal activities 
have on others. 
Of equal importance is the fact that the individual group member, through actively 
participating in the group's effort to resolve difficulties of other group members, O 
finds that he is capable of feeling for others and, in a sense, has a healing capacity 
which he had perhaps never used, or realized. In all, the marathon group participant 
will leave a successful experience with an enriched understanding of himself. He may 
have entered the encounter with a higher opinton of himself than he carries away, but 
nevertheless, he should leave with a more realistic opinion of his i nteractive skills 
and several ideas concerning how he could improve on his interpersonal relations 
behavior. 
So far little has been said about the role of the leader or facilitator in the 
marathon group except to point out that he generally takes a passive role and also 
absorbs a substantial amount of abuse for lack of directional guidance during the 
early stages of most marathon sessions. In spite of his passive posture, the group 
leader serves several important roles in the marathon encounter. Bach cites several 
functions of the leader which serve to enhance the encounter experience. /29 The 
channeling of group feedback to each member, recognition and counteraction of inti-
macy~preventi ng "games" by group members, he 1 ping the group move on to new concerns 
after exhausting one subject, and helping the group derive the most benefit out of 
emotional crises. An interesting article ·by Glueck describes a rather active group 
facilitator who provided the above impetus· in a highly aggressive manner. /30 He 
prodded group members into interaction, challenged them verbally when they were 
attempting to withdraw from the group, and imposed physical dynamics on the group when 
the free repartee declined. At first, he was heartily disliked by most group parti-
cipants, but, as time wore on, he was thoroughly accepted by the group participants 
and even defended when he was confronted by several of his colleagues to explain the 
withdrawal of three clients from the encounter program. It appears then that~ if the 
group is to be effective, the leader must be skilled at bringing individuals out" 
psychologically, and must channel the group efforts towards useful intragroup dia-
logue, rather than permitting time-consuming digressions into current topical issues. 
However. he must do this subtly or the group wi 11 grow entirely too dependent on him Q 
and thereby miss a portion of the extremely valuable open exchange of ideas between 
group members. 
Having taken a brief overview of encounter group functions, report, and benefits, 
a short survey wi•11 follow of the use of the encounter therapy procedures by industry . 
/28 Dies, R. R., and Hess, A. K., Op. cit. , p. 261. 
/29 Bach, G. R., "Marathon Group Dynamics: I , Some Functions of the Professional 
Group Facilitator:• Psychological Reports, vol 20 (3-1), p. 997. 
/30 Glueck, W. F., Ibid., p. 502. 
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There have been a number of articles in news periodicals and management journals 
describing the writers' experience in encounter groups. ~lueck's article mentioned 
earlier is a good example and was most helpful in providing a sunmary of the proceed-
ings of a typical group. His group consisted larely of 6usiness men from various 
finns and the $eneral attitude of the group was sunmed up by Glueck as follows: "It 
(the encounter) satisfied its objectives of 6etter self-awareness, better understand-
ing of the feelings of others, provided an opportunity for me to revise my attitudes 
and (hopefully) to attempt to modify my behavior towards others."/11. 
The American Management Association has shown an interest in encounter therapy. 
The basic thrust of the AMA's programs has been to help companies move from autocra-
tic hierarchies to democratic organizations of effective teams./32 Reflecting the 
view of a number of industrial-related behavioral scientist's that money is no longer 
the prime motivation towards job satisfaction and higher productivity, the effort of 
the AMA and NTL programs has been to "make managers and consultants out of bosses as 
motivation now goes beyond money. "/33 
The application of sensitivity training in industry has met with varying results 
and consequently left differing impressions on industrial leaders. One of the most 
often read complaints is that the mem6ers of a finn, who are afforded the opportunity 
to attend sensHivity sessions, do not exhtbit any noticeable long-tenn favorable 
effects. John F. De Santo of the Port of New York Authority feels that most of his 
staff members return from encounter training possessing an almost euphoric attitude 
with regard to interpersonal dealings, ·but that this objective rarely remains with 
the individual for a substantial length of time./34. Kurt W. Back also addresses 
this subject, but sees the unfortuante delusion oTthe attendees new lease on inter-
personal relations as a reaction to the frustration brought about by the fact that 
an individual cannot change the whole organization./35 
F. I. Steele points out a related problem, the attitude of top level management 
to applied behavioral science in general. He sees the sensitivity training technique 
as providing the manager with a better understanding of the problems around him and a 
realization of what hinders effective group functioning./36 He feels that the success 
of sensitivity training depends on managements ability to accept and live with the 
changed attitudes and decision processes which will emerge. Too often, top management 
negates the benefits of sensitivity training, and many other useful facets of applied 
behavioral science, for that matter, by suppressing efforts at the middle and lower 
management levels towards innovative change. 
Much of the resistance to sensitivity training by top management centers on the 
0 following management presumptions: /37 
Ill. Ibid., p. 504. 
/32 Business Week 10 Jan '70 No. 2106 p. 62. 
/33 Ibid. 
/34 Berkwitt, G. J. Ibid. p. 41. 
/35 Back, K. Ibid. p. 24. 
/~ Steele, F. I. "Can T-Group Training Change the Power Structure," Personnel 
Administration vol 33 (6) Nov/Dec 1970, p. 48. 
/37 Berkwitt, op. cit. 
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1. Mucn of the material in hehayiQral ~cience programs 
is irrelevent to bustness proolems. 
2. The effectiveness of the vartous problems has not 
been proved scienttftca l ly. 
3. Sensitivity training can be dangerous i'f not conducted 
by qualifted personnel. 
Jerry Harvey of National Training Laboratories sunmarizes the difficulty in sel-
ling various applied behavioral science programs to industry in the following quote: 
"The toughest criterta in jusUfying applied behavioral science are profit, turnover, 
absenteeism. The easiest are also the least definitive: morale, satisfaction, a 
feeltng of participation, and such."/38 
Sensitivity training methods can be applied in industry but a successful program 0 
will have to overcome several obstacles. To begin with, the most effective encounter 
groups, in my opinion, should be comprised of strangers. An individual will be more 
likely to open-up, releastng hts tnner feelings and perceived inadequacies, to stran-
gers rather than to individuals with whom he is in frequent contact. In spite of the 
mutual trust and confidential handling of information that should characterize an 
encounter group, I feel that an individual would be skeptical of revealing too much 
of himself to a business associate, for example, in fear that he would be placing him-
self at a psychological disadvantage in future dealings. Hierarchical structuring, 
seniority, etc., should be avoided in an encounter group, if free and open exchange 
is to prevail. I feel that both these requirements would be difficult to meet in an 
encounter program comprtsed of individuals from the same firm or organization. 
Louis J. Schuster of the University of Missouri Faculty states that early intra-
company encounter groups were not entirely successful in that only surface feelings 
and problems were revealed by the members. 
As a result, later programs have tried a more structured approach such as pro-
blem solving sessions, or the imposition of group agenda items such as a specific 
dtscusston of vartous leadership styles ./39 Some firms, such as ESSO, have had con-
siderable success with encounter group methods on an intracompany basis, but the use 
of this vehicle was accompanied by a general top management desire for organizational 
change./40 I believe that this feeling must be present if the full benefits of 
encounter therapy are to be realized by the firm. An autocratic or strictly profit-
oriented firm will not get significant value from sensitivity training because of the 
lack of flexibility afforded mi"ddle management, and also, the unfortunate disregard 
for the well-being of human resources. 
In conclusion, the revitalizing effect that the majority of encounter group par- O 
tfcipants report and the clinical evidence of the effectiveness of this new type of 
therapy could have a favorable effect on a man~ger. Not only could the behavioral 
patterns that typify his personal life be improved, but the better understanding of 
himself could certainly be expected to carry over into his interaction on ti1e job with 
equally favorable results. I believe that this is the real benefit of encounter ther-
apy to industry. If a firm undertakes an internal sensitivity training rirogram, it 
will no doubt force attendance by individuals who may not be well suited for the can-
did interchange t~at is required. At the least, such an individual will not be able 
/38 !bid. p. 41. 
/39 Schuster, L. J. Personnel Journal vol 48 (8) Aug '69, p. 613. 
/40 Johns, T. 11T-Group Traumas" Personnel (London) vol. l (7). 




to take an effective role in tbe group. and moreover. such an experience may be dama-
ging to him. Concerning the success of the various sensi;ttvtty therapy programs. I 
would rec011111end that top management encourage parttctpatton on tfle part of their 
employees, pay the employees entrance fee. and grant the employee the necessary time 
away from the jo6. On the other hand. I do not feel tfiat a company should attempt 
to undertake such a program on its own. or even hire a qualified professional coor-
dinator to operate the program on an tntracompany basis. The company will reap grea-
ter benefits by letting its employees go through the experience on their own and hope 
that the improved insight and sharpening of interpersonal skills the employees will 
gain in the encounter experience will result i'n enhancement of on-the-job performance. 
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The technological advances in management infonnation systems realized during the 
past decade have not, in most instances, been greeted with open anns by the rank and 
file company employee. While the advantages of a dependable MIS were recognized, not 
all companies who wished to avail of these advantages were successful in their initial 
endeavors. Some companies experienced outright failure in their attempts to install 
meaningful management information systems and associated data processing equipment; 
other companies achieved only partial implementation. The overriding factor in each 
of these cases was management's lack of concern, or at least management1s unawareness, 
of the effects of MIS on human relationships. Down through the ages there has been a 
long history of man's basic resistance to change. It should not have come as a sur-
prise, therefore, that the advent of MIS would have been subject to an appreciable 
degree of resistance. To overcome this resistance, management must understand why 
people resist change as well as improve upon its ability to sell the advantages of MI~. 
In order to remain stable and flexible and to insure long-run success, most organ-
izations must look for changes and new ideas. Because change is highly important to 
the success of an organization, it is unfortunate that many people have the tendency 
to resist it. One of the basic reasons why this resistance occurs, regardless of whe-
ther it is in the form of apathy or outright rebellion, is because most changes disturb 
the equilibrium of the situation and the environment in which individuals and groups 
exist. To overcome this disequilibrium and to return to a state of balance requires 
people to go through a period of a~aption and adjustment to the change. If management 
chooses to ignore this fundamental facet of human behavior and does nothing to help 
its employees prepare for this change or adjust to it, then resistance will occur. 
The extent of this resistance and its gravity will depend upon the nature of the peo-
ple affected and the change concerned. 
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Although disequflibrium is the result of change and the cause of resistance, it 
should be recognized that the state of disequt~ibrium which exists is actually an 
imbalance in need satisfaction . An individual ' s needs can be classified in the fol-
lowing hierarchy of importance: 
1. Physiological needs - the basic primary needs of food, clothing, 
shelter, sleep, etc. 
2. Security needs - the freedom from fear of loss of economic or 
psychological security. 
3. Social needs - the need for individual and group acceptance and a 
feeling of belongingness, and the desire for recognition , status, etc. 
4. Self-actualization - the desire to become more and more what one is , 
to become everything that one is capable of becoming •.. ,/1 
Prior to a change an individual exists within an environment in which, to a great 
degree, his needs are satisfied. When a change occurs, it represents a threat to his 
need satisfaction and, therefore, the individual resists the change. It is only when 
he recognizes that the change will not affect his need satisfaction or when he adapts 
himself to a change and reestablishes his equalibrium will resistance disappear. In 
either case, however, some degree of adjustment will occur. 
The types and kinds of changes that cause disequilibrium and resistance are legion 
in number. Whether such changes are the result of technological advancement or manag-
erial efficiency makes little difference - a threat to security, status, and other 
basic needs has occurred. Consequently, even if the change is potentially beneficia l 
to the employee, resistance usually results. It should come as no surprise to manage-
ment, therefore, that employees would envision an automated management information 
system as a threat to their security within the organization . Behind the hostility 
to an innovation which will threaten the security of any employee is fear. Fear of 
losing his job,being displaced, demoted, loss of prestige, loss of earnings, etc. are 
all examples of the day-to-day fears or anxieties experienced by the young or old 
employee who is subject to change. 
0 
It should be realized that the average rank-and-file employee in industry today, 
unlike his counterpart of fifty years ago, is much more economically dependent upon his 
job tenure. He does not possess the craftsmanship or skill which was in such great 
demand fifty years ago. Consequently, the employee who has spent ten to twenty years 
in a particular line of work has gained litt l e that is considered saleable . It is 
because of this that there exists such a feeling of need for some form of job security 
among most working people (whether it be seniority or some other form of property rights 0 
in the job). It is not difficult to realize, therefore, why anything that threatens 
job security or hardwon status, such as it is, is desperately feared and resisted. 
Resistance to change can take many forms. 11At one extreme, people suffer a tem-
porary disequilibrium in need satisfaction, ask a few questions about the change, 
quickly adjust to it, and resume their previous behavior. At the other extreme, reac-
tion can take the fonn of open opposition, rebellion, and even destruction. 11/l, In 
/l A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), 
p. 91. 
/l,_ I. L. Heckman, Jr . and S. G. Huneryager, Human Relations in Management 





between these extremes are many other forms of behavior, such as apathy, indifference, 
and antagonism. Whatever general form resistance to change may take, it is important 
for managers to recognize that human behavior will always be influenced by it. This 
means that i11T11ediately or ultimately the change will exert an impact on employee per-
formance. Depending upon the nature of the resistance, therefore, behavior can be 
reflected in such things as quantity and quality of product, absenteeism, tardiness, 
turnover, grievances, accidents, and even outright strikes. It is imperative, there-
fore, that management make every effort possible to effectuate the change properly and 
to facilitate adjustment to it. 
Before management can initiate corrective measures to prevent and overcome resis-
tance to change, management must first respect and understand employee reaction to 
change. "Altogether too frequently, people in leadership positions assume that because 
a change will definitely be beneficial to people, it will be acceptable to them."/1 
Actually, nothing could be further from the truth. Consequently, whether threats to 
need satisfaction are real or imagined, they must always be recognized as powerful 
motivators of behavior. As such, some manner or norm of adjustment facilitation must 
take place. Another important point to understand is that there is no one simple pana-
cea for preventing or overcoming resistance to change. In most situations management 
will be required to utilize many methods, techniques, and procedures to overcome the 
resistance to the implementation of an automated management information system. 
Resistance to change will not prevail among the rank-and-file members of the 
organization only, it will also exist among the foremen or middle managers. Foremen 
will see the implementation of MIS as a challenge to their position within the organ-
ization; fear is not the sole property of the lower-level employee. Perhaps what fore-
men fear most is their inability to conforn1 to required changes, to learn the new sys-
tem and procedures dictated by a management information system. The majority of fore-
men have given over twenty years of service to the organization, are in middle age, 
and to a great extent are "set in their ways. 11 They have become accustomed to making 
the majority of the decisions which affect their sub-organization, and with their posi-
tion has come a certain degree of prestige and responsibility. The majority of the 
foremen view the introduction of MIS as a challenge to their job and the possible elim-
ination of several of their positions within the organization. This feeling prevails 
particularly in those industries where the functions of the foremen are highly repeti-
tive in nature and can easily be computer progra11T11ed. Few of the foremen view the 
implementation of MIS as a management tool to be used to their advantage. They do not 
accept the theory that MIS will provide them with up-to-date infonnation which will 
help them in their decisionmaking processes and consequently make more time available 
for performing other important duties. Few foremen are willing to recognize the advan-
tages of MIS as did Peter Drucker, who stated that " ... the computer is restructuring 
these jobs, enabling us to organize work where it logically belongs, and to free middle 
managers for more important duties."/.i Foremen, in general, who resist change see it 
as a challenge to the privileges, prestige, status, and authority which they now enjoy 
and as a threat to their security. Few have the foresight to see it in the eyes of 
Peter Drucker. So when we speak of resistance to change, we should not envision it as 
resistance on the part of the rank-and-file employee only, but also the resistance to 
be expected from foremen and/or middle managers. 
In ignoring the human factors involved, the implementation of a management infor-
mation system can have far-reaching consequences. Failure to secure employee support 
/3 I. L. Heckman, Jr. and S. G. Huneryager, Human Relations in Management 
(Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing Co., 1960), p. 474. 
/4 Donald K. Sanders, "Computers, Organization and Managers: Some Questions 
and Speculations, 11 SAM Advanced Management Journal, (July 1969), p. 78. 
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has resulted in the failure of management systems in several companies. Employee 
support alone will not solve all the inherent probl ems of an MIS. However, manage-
ment can not overcome other problems without it. It may seem surprising that fore-
men and middle managers have to be won over. As loyal company employees, it should 
actually be expected that they would be in favor of any change that would appear to 
be in the company's good. Human ature being what it is. people may say that they 
welcome progress. However, they will not actively support it unless it means per-
sonal progress, those affected by the change will fight it in every way, overtly or 
covertly. 
Employee resentment, like fear, is easy to trace and understand. It is a trait 
of human nature to resent what is not completely understood if it represents a poten-
tial danger. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why employees will resent 
and fear an MIS in the company. Most people think that computers and their associated O 
systems are synonymous with mass unemployment. The rank-and-file employee will look 
at the computer as a threat to his job; the foreman will fear for his position and 
status. If top management does nothing t o allay these fears and suspicions, then it 
can be expected that either morale will ebb until an individual cannot do his work or 
he will begin to fight back, actively or passively. 
There is a distincti on between making an organizational change and managing an 
organizational change. While both psychological evidence and practical experience 
confinn the fact that employees will resist change, it is equally true that people 
may also react favorably to change if they understand what the change is all about and 
are prepared for it in advance. Basically, employees prefer to stay with the status 
quo, for in the existing setting they feel stable, secure, and comfortable. They have 
established their equilibrium within the realms of the status quo and resent any out-
side influence which will disrupt their equilibrium. If management is to disrupt this 
equilibrium and overcome the anticipated resistance to a management infonnation system, 
it must call upon all the available "selling" expertise of its top managers. Top man-
agement must sell first to middle management and then to rank-and-file members the fact 
that a need exists for a meaningful MIS and, secondly, that the needs of the individual 
are recognized and will be respected. This selling project must be initiated before 
any attempt is made in introducin g a MIS. It must continue during the implementation 
stage and should not be culminated before management is satisfied that the MIS is oper-
ating efficient ly and resistance to it has been completely overcome. 
Sound management is characterized by readiness and abi l ity to effect an orderly 
transition when a change is indicated. Naturally, the decision to make a change of 
major proportions should be based on real and compelling reasons. It should definitely 
not be just to further the personal interests of business bureaucrats , or for any rea-
son other than to improve overall business perfonnance. There is a tendency in some 
companies to make unnecessary changes too frequently . The work force of such an orga- 0 
nization is sensitive to these situations and they understandably conclude that changes 
are being made on the basis of whim and personal inclination, rather than as a result 
of study and deliberation. Top management endeavoring to sell an innovative MIS in 
such an organization can expect to face strong resistance. 
The management team burdened with the responsibility of selling MIS to the company's 
employees should have a thorough understanding of the company's fonnal and informal 
organizations - and the ability to integr~te the two as much as ~ossible. Cliques and 
al liances within the company often take a position, pro or con, in regard_to propos7d 
changes. Here the effectiv 7ness ~f the ma~ager is put ~o the test, for his o~n atti- ~ tude and his capacity for discussion, criticism, communication, and consul~at1~n are 
vital in modifying the stand of groups that are opposed to the change and 1n w1nnin~ 




provides a detailed analysis of the role of the manager in formal and informal orga-
nizations. 
Once top management has decided to introduce a management information system, its 
selling approach should be conducted along two fronts: the logical and the psycholo-
gical. The logical approach is usually more obvious than the psychological, and that 
is why the psychological is so often overlooked, with adverse effects. Human relations 
are often jeopardized, not because of the change itself, but because the people involved 
feel that they are being maneuvered, manipulated, or pressured into the change. People 
also often feel that they have no opportunity to express their doubts or feelings about 
whether the change really represents an improvement. Additionally, since they feel 
that their security is being threatened, or because the social relationships of the 
work group are being disturbed or dislocated, etc., adds to their feeling of unrest and 
builds resistance to change. It is vital, then, that the psychological factors involved 
in change be given as much attention as the logical factors if the change is to be satis-
factorily effected. The psychological. and logical approaches to the problem cannot be 
attacked as two separate problems to be overcome. They are not separate sequences as 
there is a definite amount of interfacing between the two approaches and the management 
team selling the change must be aware of this interplay and exploit it wisely as they 
proceed. 
If top management is to approach the overall problem of implementing a management 
information system and, concurrently, overcoming the resistance to it in a logical man-
ner, it is · imperative that the team understand in detail the reason for this change. 
The team must understand the company1s philosophy, goals, and objectives and how the 
proposed MIS will affect them. The team must be familiar with the present operating 
procedures and how MIS will contribute or 'detract from these procedures. The team must 
be satisfied in their own minds that the required changes cannot be effected without 
the aid of MIS. In other words, there should not exist a simpler or less disruptive 
system available which would produce the same required results. Once top management is 
satisfied that a total MIS is the route to follow, then the brainpower of both line and 
staff people should be tapped. Union representatives should alsq be informed of the 
proposed changes and kept informed as the project progresses. The logical approach 
would also dictate that this homogeneous team should be responsible for the implementa-
tion of the MIS and for educating and training the other managerial and nonmanagerial 
personnel who would be affected by the new system. The implementation team should also 
make the necessary adjustments to job descriptions, work requirements, personnel posi-
tions, standards of performance, etc. Additionally, the responsibilities of those affi-
liated with the new MIS should be clearly established. 
In addition to this logical approach, and simultaneous with it, management should 
also be following the psychological approach. The goal of the psychological approach 
should be to attain acceptance of the MIS with a minimum of resistance. One of the . 
first steps taken should be to disseminate advance word to all concerned that the com-
pany is contemplating installing MIS, a change that will affect them. The shock of 
unannounced change can seriously affect morale; if the word does not get out officially, 
it is bound to get out via the grapevine. The psychological team should make every 
effort to gain acceptance of the fact that MIS will be of benefit to the company and 
the employee. Perhaps it can be shown that competitors have installed such a system 
and are enjoying benefits from it. Those personnel who will become involved and actu-
ally participate in the overall project should be designated in the early stages of the 
change. The more people who can participate, the more assured of success the project 
will be. The real leaders of the various informal organizations within the company 
should be known and the proposed MIS should be sold to their groups via the leader. At 
the initial meeting during which the management information system is presented, the 
presentation should be made by a member of top management generally acceptable to the 
rank-and-file employee. Selection of the wrong person can create resistance to the 
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project before it is even ready to get off the planning stage. The project is identi-
fied with the speaker and any antagonism towards him will make the idea unacceptable 
to the listeners. Many organizations have learned to their dismay that a management 
information system cannot be effectively implemented in a short period of time. Suf-
ficient time must be allowed not only for the implementation phase but also for adjust-
ments - organizational, technical, and human. "It takes time to develop new skills, 
depart from old habits and settings, establish new relationships or even to reorient 
oneself to familiar situations with a new twist."/[ 
It is important that employees realize what types of jobs will be eliminated. 
MIS, in general, will eliminate repetitive, monotonous, and primarily cl erical jobs 
that normally show a high turnover rate. It should not be difficu l t, therefore, for 
the management planning group to insure that all personnel reductions are realized 
through attrition . To further allay the fears of the organization ' s employees and to O 
enhance the success of MIS, a trai ning program should be initiated to train empl oyees 
for the new, higher-paying positions. 
During the implementation phase of the MIS, employees should be kept informed of 
progress via special reports, lectures, organization newspapers, etc. Any additional 
employees hired during the implementation phase should be designated temporary help 
unless they are technical personnel considered necessary for the successful operation 
of the MIS. Following the implementation of the computer equipment, all employees 
would be taken in groups on conducted tours of the computer installation. Additionally, 
employees should be shown motion pictures on MIS, in general, and pictorial displays of 
the organization's specific system. These tours should be conducted by senior managers 
of the new systems department in an effort to maintain employee support by providing as 
much information as possible on the system, the method of operation, and the benefits 
to be derived by the employees and the organization. 
It is an old adage that "there is no substitute for teamwork." No one will tend 
to oppose the program if he is part of it. Active participation in planning the sys-
tem is an effective means of winning the support of department heads and their assis-
tants. The question of participation is a critical part of the overall program of 
winning the support of employees. The matter should be given careful consideration 
with one overriding guiding princi ple : The planning group should be of manageable 
size and made up of interested and competent personnel with the widest possible depart-
mental representation, with preference to the departments that will be affected by the 
MIS installation. 
The entire program of selli ng MIS and winning personnel support for it can be a 
rewarding one. It can create an "esprit de corps" in the company. If properly planned 
and implemented, both the employer and the employee can reap long-range benefits from 
a meaningful management information system. Each employee will have a more interesting O 
and rewarding job as a result of the information system. And the increased effective-
ness of each employee will result in a better and more profitable company, with a deci-
ded advantage over its competitors. 
/_§_ Nathaniel Stewart. 11Are They Ready for Change?", Management Review 
(October 1961), p. 6. 
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Introduction 
The continued peaceful existence of a nation amid the complexities of the modern 
world is a matter that challenges the intellect of man. The national security policy 
of a democratic country is an amalgamation of diverse considerations. The moral and 
economic considerations operate through the existing political structure in deter-
mining the direction of policy. The portion of this policy that involves military 
forces as an instrument of national security is a facinating study. It is the respon-
sibility of the military forces to carry out their assigned tasks within the bounds 
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of monetary and technological constraints. While remaining both responsive and respon-
sible to the control of the policy makers, military men must turn plans into the reali-
ty of action. The U. s. Navy has maintained a major role in this constantly changing 
milieu of national security. It is the purpose of this paper to concentrate only on 
the evolving policy of strategic deterrence, ignoring much of the moral, economic, and O 
political forces to which it owes its genesis. To create an understanding of the pre-
sent and prognosticate the future, it will be necessary to dwell all too briefly on 
historical background. The managers of the Navy should not hesitate to take a paro-
chial view of their functions, particularly in hopes of achieving greater efficiency 
in the management of resources. · 
Historical Development of Deterrent Strategy 
The United States found itself at the end of World War II in the position of 
having exclusive possession of the most fonnidable machine of war yet devised - the 
atomic bomb. Several other significant situations persisted at that time: The u. s. 
was the predominant sea power and had the predominant productive poweri Russia was 





was toward the establishment of peaceful means of maintaining world order: i.e., 
the founding of the United Nations. The continuing development of strategic weapons 
and delivery systems progressed in a low-key, splintered manner for several years. 
A strengthening of purpose was caused by a succession of events that began in 1948 
with the Russian block~de of Berlin. This test of the allies 1 resolve was closely 
followed by_the explosion of the first Russian nuclear device in 1949. The Korean 
War brought with it ihe realization of the need for conventional forces to fight 
limited wars and illuminated the reluctance to use nuclear tactical weapons. The 
failure of this conflict to expand into general war persuaded some that it was the 
presence of the nuclear deterrent that kept it within bounds. Whatever the reasons, 
a precedent of non-use had been established and destined to be repeated in Southeast 
Asia several years later. 
Massive Retaliation 
The Eisenhower administration, devoted to ending the Korean War and reducing 
defense expenditures, assumed the reins of government in 1953. The evolving policy 
of national security encompassed a reliance on deterrent power with a concomitant 
reluctance to become involved in land wars, particularly in Asia. This 11Massive 
Reta1iation 11 doctrine was paralleled by the awareness that the Russi an capability in 
weapo~ry was approaching that of the United States. Russia had trailed the U.S. by 
four years on the explosion of a nuclear device, but only by eight months in the tes-
ting of a thermonuclear one. The pursuance of the doctrine of massive 
retaliation resulted in the development of intermediate range ballistic miss1Jes oy 
the Air Force (Thor) and the Army (Jupiter) and their subsequent deployment to 
Europe under Air Force control in the late l950's. The latter part of that decade 
also saw the early work on research for the follow-on system for the still develop-
ing Atlas program, the Titan Intercontinental BaTiistic Missile (ICBM). Development 
work was begun for a reconnaissance satellite. Two dramatic events occurred in 1957 
that generated considerable reaction in the United States: the announcement by the 
Russians of the successful testing of an ICBM and the launching of the 11Sputnik11 
satellite. 
Another significant a~hievement of this era was the developm~nt of solid missile 
fuel, which pennitted taking advantage of the advances being made in miniaturization 
of electronic components and warhead design. This progress culminated in the evolution 
of the Air Force Minuteman and Navy Polaris missile systems. 
The Eisenhower programs led to a remarkable advancement in massive retaliation 
capabilities. but the severe budget restraints of the period resulted in the downgra-
ding of conventional warfare capabilities such as tactical air forces and non-strategic 
missiles. The widespread U. S. reaction to the perceived Russian "threat" produced 
potent political issues such as the "missile gap" controversy (which was subsequently 
disproved). 
Assured Destruction 
The Kennedy-Johnson administrations recognized the weaknesses that had been engen-
dered by the emphasis on massive retaliation. The conventional forces received addi-
tional emphasis and budgets increased accordingly. The strategic force buildup leveled 
off and the policy of flexible response became the doctrine for responding to the need 
for limited warfare. This policy was instrumental in the successful resolution of the 
Russian missile buildup in Cuba. but can also be credited for the involvement in the 
Vietnam situation. The Minuteman and Polaris forces assumed larger strategic roles 
and the Air Force strategic bomber forces remained at a somewhat constant level. Pre-
sident Kennedy and his advisors were undoubtedly influenced by a book published by 
Bernard Brodie in 1959 that was comprehensive statement of the need for the develop-
ment of a range of responses./l 
/l Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1959) 
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The Nixon Doctrine - Realistic Deterrence ; 
With the advent of the Nixon administrtion, it became clear that the forces of 
change had again created the need for a readjustment of national secur ity policy. 
Internal domestic problems combined with the moral arousal and changing mood of the 
nation to force a restructuring of national priorities. The graduated withdrawal from 
an unpopular war in Indochina was providing the possibilities of channeling money and 
forces into more productive applications for the nation. In 1968 the Brookings 
Institution published a study that was collection of essays on some of the urgent 
issues that would confront ·the new administration./1 Two articles are of particular 
interest for our.purposes. First the article by Henry Kissinger on the central issues 
of foreign policy provides great insight into the development of policy since his 
assumption of an irfluential role in government./1 Second, the essay by Carl Kaysen 
surveys the area of military strategy. military forces and arms control ./! Dr. Kaysen O 
analyzes the economic aspects of a continuing policy of military "superiority" vis-a-
vis the Russians. The extreme costs encountered in the development of weapons sys-
tems that are required to maintain a measure of strategic superiority provide the 
motivating force for finding some common ground of agreement on anns limitations. 
The Nixon doctrine is an attempt at integrating as many aspects of foreign policy 
with military strategy as possible. The key aspects of this doctrine are: (l) requi-
ring our .allies to assume a greater share of the burden of mutual defense, particu-
larly where supplying of manpower for defense in involved, (2) increased military and 
economic aid to friendly countries, (3) the continued strategic role of the United 
States in providing a 11nuclear shield" for the Free World. 
Strategic Deterrence in the 1970's 
The spectre of an multinational nuclear club has grown fitfully and has been 
shrouded in secrecy. What had started after World War II as a Russia/United States 
exclusive struggle has nowexpanded to include England, France, and mainland China. 
Even though the "Super Powers" remain the principle actors in the play, the parts of 
the secondary players cannot be ignored. 
The Russians have concentrated on developing a first strik~ capability. The 
use of large yield ICBM's to provide the "threat" of destruction has proven to be 
effective. The United States, while possessing the capability to launch a first 
strike, espoused a policy of restraining its forces to the role of only responding 
to an enemy attack. While the Russians have been able to feel relative ly secure 
in the knowledge that no U.S. President would initiate a first st r ike under any 
plausible set of circumstances, the U.S. had no such confidence. 
The last two decades have been replete with move and countermove between the 
two major powers. Policies have been motivated by fear of what might be, rather 
than certain knowledge of what is. The escalating nature of nuclear weapon develop-
ment and deployment has galloped headlong through the postwar period. The United 
States throughout this period has tended to over-exagerate the Soviet's first strike 
capability and has attempted to maintain its nuclear "superiority. 11/i Even the term 
11superiority 11 has been outmoded by the times. There can be no superiority in the nu-
clear age. The consequences of use of the available weapons gives us the basis for 
defining 11parity 11 as a more useable term. Both the United States and Russia possess 
sufficient nuclear strength to survive an initial strike and still provide an assured 
second strike to destroy the enemy's ability, or will, to continue in any conflict. 
fl Kennit Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation (Wahsington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1968) 
/1 Ibid. , pp. 585-614. 
/i Ibid. , pp.549-584. 
/i Bernard Brodie, ed. , The Future of Deterrence in the U. S. Strate~y. A 
study prepared for the United States Air Force by the Security Studies Pro ect of the 
University of California, Los Angeles. 1968, pp. 20-21. 





The technology of advanced weapon design and construction has raced ahead, far 
outstripping any coherent policy concerntng the implications of their employment. We 
are reaching the point where the economic costs of providing counterforces are over-
burdening. It is also reasonable to assume that the Russians are encountering simi-
lar constraints. Although our political system makes our government more susceptible 
to popular opinion and internal problems, the Russians do not possess the industrial 
or economic capacity for some of the costly weapons developments that are probable in 
the near future. 
Present Balance 
In the past two years the Soviets have been engaged in an expansion of both 
their first strike and counterforce capabilities. The deployment of Submarine-Launched 
Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) similar to the U. s. Polaris/Poseidon missile has evoked a 
startling awareness of the relative parity between the two nations. The Secretary of 
Defense has released figures comparing the relative strengths in mid-1971. These fig-
ures show that the Russians enjoy a numerical superiority in land-launched ICBM's of 
l ,500 to about 1,000. The U. S. leads in submarine-launched missiles by 656 to 400 
(with Russia in a high building period) and in long-range bombers by 650 to 150./§. 
While the Soviets have developed larger warheads, the U.S. has concentrated in smal-
ler warheads with greater delivery accuracy to achieve a similar measure of destruc-
tive potenti a 1 . 
The United States has maintained a technological advantage in the deployment of 
MIRV's (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles). These were first deployed 
in the spring of 1971 on a Poseidon equipped submarine./I The MIRV capability is also 
being deployed in the Minuteman III missile. 
Thus, it can be seen that both of the major powers are using the concept of the 
"triad" of weapons delivery systems (land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, 
and long-range bombers), although in differing mistures. It is not conceivable that 
one adversary would be capable of destroying all three methods of retaliation of the 
other. Therefore, the means for delivering a second-strike is almost assured to each 
of the adversaries. The technological and economic capacities for providing adequate 
defense against each method of delivery is not likely to develop within the next decade. 
A Credible Deterrent 
The possibility of establishing a "credible deterrent" is a difficult matter in 
the modern situation. In order to establish such a deterrent a major power must con-
sider the following requisite conditions: 
1. The ability to mount a counter attack against the other major power in 
the case of direct confrontation. 
2. The ability to deal with a lesser nuclear power that possesses the ability 
to reduce one country's capacity to retaliate against its major opponent, 
thus upsetting the existing balance. 
3. The ability to deal with non-nuclear powers in such a manner as to prevent 
the possibility of escalation into a nuclear exchange between major powers./.§. 
/§_ William Beecher, "Experts See Soviet and U. S. Nuclear Arsenal in Rough 
Balance," New York Times, May 21, 1971, p. 2 • 
/7 George Weiss, "Strategic Deterrence: Rationale, Negotiations, Threat, and 
Status:" Armed Forces Journal, 7 June 1971, p. 25. 
/.§. Arthur Lee Burns, Ethics and Deterrence, Adelphi Papers Number 69. (London: 
The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970). 
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It is exactly in this respect that President Nixon has fonnulated t he doctrine of 
"Real istic Deterrence." 
Strategic Anns l imitation Talks (SALT) 
The fact that the Soviet Union has been participating actively i n talks concern-
i ng the limiting of strategic anns indicates that the Russian attit ude is changing. 
Some observers are optimistic concerning the likelihood of achieving relative stabi-
lity, at least at the nuclear weapons level, in the adversary relat ionship of the 
United States and Russia./.2, The evidence of an emerging "modernistic" Soviet view 
of foreig n pol icy is further substantiated by the announcement of agreement to con-
centrate the SALT discussions for this year on the limiting of anti-missi le defenses 
and the limiti ng of the number of some offensive weapons./10 
The SALT talks hold significant implications for the 1970's . It is likely that 
agreements reached in the near future will dictate the numerical level of deployed 
weapons. The a9reements reached will probably restrict the deployment of anti-ballis-
tic missile (AB) systems to a 0 thin 11 system for each power. The likelihood of develop-
ment of a satisfactory 11thick 11 ABM is extremely small in view of the cost and the fact 
that neither country currently has the requisite technology to develop anti-MIRV capa-
bility. It is this NIRV capability of the U. S. missiles that will best deter the 
Soviets from developing a thick ABM due to the cost-ineffectiveness of such a system. /11 
The next most probable development will be some means of restricting the number of -
deployed missiles without specifying their particular capabilities, such as MIRV. The 
possibi l ity of agreement in this area appears unlikely, since it is essentially an 
unenforceable condition without inspections. This limitation in number, but not capa-
bility, will encourage continued technical "improvement" in complexity. The result 
wil l be the sustenance of destructive parity. Of more long-range concern will be t he 
restraint of the development of increasingly terrible concepts such as space-based or 
satellite weapons systems, microbiological, or geophysical warfare. /11 The attention of 
this paper will be directed to the decade of the 19701s and the implications for the Navy. 
Why a Thin ABM? 
The thin ABM fits into the scheme of both the triad of weapons delivery systems and 
the ability to deal with the mi nor nuclear powers (notably China). Malcolm W. Hoag has 
sunmar ized the advantages of a thin ABM as follows: (1) the hard-point protection of 
missil e silos, (2) the denial of high-confidence to either side that it could launch 
"li ght" nuclear attacks upon the other's homeland in response, say, to the use of nuclear 
weapons in European confli cts, and thus, t he reinforcement of deterrence against any such 
light attack, (3) protection against any small accidenta_l attack, and (4) for any would-
be nuclear power that aspires to retaliatory capabilities against one or both of the 
superpowers, raising the price tag for such capabilities to high, and perhaps prohibitive 
levels./Q 
/'1. Lawrence T. Caldwell, Soviet Attitudes to SALT, Adelphi Papers Number 75 
(London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 21. 
/.!Q. Max Frankel, "U.S. and Russians to Stress ABM's at Arms Parley, 11 New York 
Times, May 21, 1971, p. 1. 
/11 Malcolm W. Hoag, Statement on the Military Budget and National Economic 
Priorities (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation {P-4107) 1969, p. 5. 
/R Nigel Calder , ed., Unless Peace Comes A Scienti fic Forecast of New Wea ons 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1968, pp. 231- 243. 
/.11 Malcolm W. Hoag, What New Look in Defense? (Santa Monica,=California: Rand 










The Role of the Navy in the 19701s 
It is virtually certain that the United States will continue with the triad concept 
throughout the 19701 s. However, there are several factors that indicate that there will 
be an increase in the magnitude of the role of the Navy. The Air Force fleet of long-
range bombers is aging. The technology necessary to counteract a bomber attack is with-
in economic feasibility. The development of a follow-on bomber (the B-1) has been fit-
ful and, even with an increased funding request, will not fly before 1974. 
- The Minuteman wiflcontinue to be the land-based missile backbone. upgraded with 
MIRV capability. However. the cost of providing protection against missile attack is 
prohibitive and not at hand technologically. Public reaction is against increased 
funding of ABM for site protection. The feasibility and cost of mobile Minuteman 
deployment makes it an unlikely alternative to ABM./11. There is an increase in public 
pressure to remove missiles from mainland sites in order to decrease the danger to 
the public either from incoming attacks on missile sites or from the fallout from 
anti-missiles. 
Thus. while retaining the triad. the United States will most likely increase the 
proportional number of sea-based missiles. This will satisfy most of the current limi-
ting criteria for strategic deterrent weapons systems. It is relatively immune from 
detection in the deployed condition. hence. the ballistic missile submarine has good 
survivability (at least in the present state of technology). The distance from the 
mainland provides the population a measure of protection in case of attack on the sub-
marine. 
The current sea-based missile arsenal consists of 41 Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Submarines. of which 31 will eventually be equipped with the new Poseidon missile. 
This missile is the follow-up to the Polaris family of missiles of the past ten years. 
With MIRV equipped warheads, the Poseidon missile represents a significant increase 
in capabilities./]! 
The Next Generation - ULMS 
The inrnense logic of a sea-based deterrent is gaining popularity among both 
defense planners and members of Congress./1§. The principal limitation of the Polaris/ 
Poseidon system has been the range of the missile. The current A-3 Polaris range is· 
about 2,500 miles. Al though Poseidon has far greater accuracy and penetrability, 
its range is only slightly greater than Polaris. · 
'The President has requested 110 million dollars in the 1972 Fiscal Year budget 
to fund the continuing research on the proposed Underwater Long-range Missile System 
(ULMS)./17 With a potential deployment date late in the l970's. ULMS could assume a 
vital roTe in the 19801s. The ULMS will provide the submarine with a mid-ocean opera-
ting area, greatly reducing the possibility of counter action. This greater operating 
area also makes the defensive problem more complicated as it increases the width of 
the sector from which an attack may originate. 
The ULMS submarine will be larger than today1s variety due to a larger missile 
and an expected greater number of missiles to be carried. This larger submarine may 
require new handling facilities with deep draft channels. This will be offset by a 
decrease in reliance on overseas replenishment sites. 
The size of the ULMS fleet will be smaller than the present Polaris/Poseidon 
fleet, with most estimates at about 25./18 The cost of the new program is currently - · -- - - ---- - - --- --- -· . 
/14 Joseph Volz. "Mobile Minuteman Labeled Wild Scheme" Armed Forces Journal 
20 Junel970, p. 14. 
/15 Frank Leary, "ULMS: Wi 11 al 1 the Targets Go to Sea?". Armed Forces Manage-
ment. May 1970. p. 38. 
/1§. "Sea Hawks Opt for ULMS,11 Armed Forces Journal 1 16 May 19701 pp. 10-11. 
IJ1.. U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1972-1976 Defense Program and the F.Y. 1972 
Defense Budget" 
/1.§_ Leary, op. cit. 1 pp. 39-40. 
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estimated at about 15 billion dolfars: with the pessimists guessing at 25 billion./~ 
If speculation concerning a possible SALT agreement in the future limiting the numbe~ 
of missiles proves true, it would appear that future plans would be to gradually retire 
the Polaris/Poseidon fleet. The first to go would be the ten submarines that are n~t 
scheduled to be converted to Poseidon. Important decisions beyond this year's funding 
for ULMS will orobablv await the outcome of the current round of SALT. 
The Chief of Naval Operations announced at a recent press conference that an 
alternative sea-based missile program was under consideration./20 Dubbed EXPO, it is 
an extended Poseidon Missile that would fit into the existing submarines. As yet 
unfunded, EXPO is very much in the speculative stage. Since it offers a possible al-
ternative to ULMS at much smaller cost, it is sure to attract much attention and con-
troversy. /,ll 
What Must Be Done to Meet the Challenge? 
Most of the improvements and new developments in equipment necessary to meet the 
requirements of ULMS appear to be well within the technological capability of the re-
search scientist. Among the improvements are: improved missile propulsion for the 
longer range within shipboard size constraints, improved ship navigational accuracy 
consistent with the system requirements, improved missile accuracy, and increased 
reactor core lifetime to provide longer time between overhauls (to obtain more time 
on station). An orderly, properly funded program, adequately managed in the tradition 
of the Polaris program, should provide the expected capabilities. 
However, some of the more mundane matters must receive the attention of the 
systems planners. False economy must not cause the slighting of the support area for 
the submarines. As the time between overhauls increases beyond the already consider-
able five years, much serious attention must be paid to traditional engineering mat-
ters. The present submarine is experiencing an excessive amount of trouble from 
equipment that has not received proper attention during development work. Examples 
of this are: sea valve operation and sea water piping material, high pressure air 
piping, electrical insulation and air conditioning. Although intermediate level 
maintenance is exceptional today in the Polaris force, it will have to be even bet-
ter in the ULMS force. This will not come easily or cheaply. 
Finally, the most pervasive, perplexing problem of the future submarine force is 
the retention of the necessary, motivated, qualified personnel. An excellent commen-
tary on the current crisis in personnel retention within the submarine force during 
the years since the advent of nuclear power was recently published in the United States 
Naval Institute Proceedtngs./22 The significance of this problem will be magnified 
by the drive for a "volunteerarmed forces." We should not consider that the nature 
of the problem is new. The Personnel Research Division of the Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel sponsored an investigation into the anticipated problems of the operations of 
FBM submarines in 1958, prior to the first patrol. Two of the several areas studied 
are particularly interesting. These two areas are habitability and motivation. While 
the former proved to be merely troublesome on occasion~ the latter has proven to be 
insidious. The portions of the motivation problem that the investigators forecast 
to be serious were sensory (or activity) deprivation, the role of leadership, particu-
larly by the Commanding Officer, knowledge of one's situation, and identification 
with one's unit./23 The advances of technology have far outstripped our ability to 
understand what motivates a person to want to do a certain job. The Navy must look 
again at the management of the personnel resources, insuring that the problem of per-
sonnel motivation receives at least as much attention as the technology that is pla-
cing ever greater demands on people. 
/19 ''ULMS: Another Answer?," Armed ~rces Journal, 20 June 1970, p. 18. 
A fZl'.l National Journal, September 4. 197 , p. 1360. 
/21 James D. Hessman and Benjamin F. Schemmer," 'Expanded Poseidon' Clouds 
ULMS Picture", Armed Forces Journal , August 1971 , pp. 16-17. 
/22 Captain Tom B. Tharrrn, U. S. Navy, 0 The Quiet Crisis in the Silent Service'' 
UnitedStates Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1971, pp. 50-58. 
/23 A. s. Levine, "Major Problem Areas in Personnel Management" and "Hab itabi-
lity and Motivation as Related to the Polaris Submarine,0 Polaris Personnel Research 
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